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HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR ROCKET ENGINES
ABSTRACT
The functional framework of a failure detection algorithm for the
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is developed. The basic algorithm
is based only on existing SSME measurements. Supplemental
measurements, expected to enhance failure detection effectiveness,
are identified.
To support the algorithm development, a figure of merit is defined
to estimate the likelihood of SSME criticality 1 failure modes and
the failure modes are ranked in order of likelihood of occurrence.
Nine classes of failure detection strategies are evaluated and
promising features are extracted as the basis for the failure
detection algorithm.
The failure detection algorithm provides early warning capabilities
for a wide variety of SSME failure modes. Preliminary algorithm
evaluation, using data from three SSME failures representing three
different failure types, demonstrated indications of imminent
catastrophic failure well in advance of redline cutoff in all three
cases.
III

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION
Currently rocket engine protection consists of a redline system that
issues an engine cutoff if a measured value exceeds a pre-determined
operation limit for any of several parameters. For the SSME, seven key
engine parameters are monitored during mainstage and their limits are set
at levels above which safe engine operation is impaired. Reliance on this
system alone, however, has led to premature engine cutoff caused by
combinations of normal excursions and engine-to-engine (and even test-
to-test) variations of the redline parameters. Moreover, during
developmental and operational firings, over forty severe failures have
resulted in extensive damage to the engine and components even though
the engine was being monitored with the redline system.
During a SSME ground test, about 500 measurements are normally recorded
in addition to visual coverage such as film, video and crew observation.
The measurement system acquires data on critical parameters such as
pressures, temperatures, flowrates, rotational speeds, valve positions,
etc., that reflect internal engine performance. Monitoring of some of
these additional parameters using techniques more advanced than standard
redlines is expected to provide more complete failure coverage for the
engine and enable earlier failure detection. The System for Anomaly and
Failure Detection (SAFD) is one such system being developed (ref. 1&2). It
increases engine protection by monitoring a relatively large number of
parameters (23), placing fairly tight tolerance bands around nominal
values and/or a measured average for each parameter, and issuing a cutoff
if a predetermined number of parameters exceed their tolerance bands
(e.g. four anomalous sensors might be required for cutoff).
The.goal of this program is to further enhance safety monitoring through
development of an advanced framework for a failure detection system. The
health management system for rocket engines (HMSRE) framework is the
result of this effort.
A key feature of the failure detection strategy for the HMSRE framework
is the determination of overall engine health from calculated engine level
anomaly parameters. These parameters are a combination of individual,
weighted sensor deviations correlated to provide either an overall
anomaly value or indications of a specific degradation (e.g. loss of HPFT
efficiency). This approach is in marked contrast to existing failure
detection schemes which rely on definition of anomalies for individual
parameters. Definition of engine level parameters allows the HMSRE to
detpct a wide variety of early failure indications, all of them applicable
to the SSME. For example, the first indication of a failure may be a large
deviation in only a few sensors or it may be subtle changes in a relatively
large number of sensors. Since the HMSRE is not dependent on individual
sensor ar, omalies, a group of subtle changes is as detectable as a few
major dev_ai, ions, even if some of the parameters never deviate enough to
be considered "anomalous". This capability is especially attractive for
relatively slow failures in which many parameters generally drift off
nominal. Slow failures are of particular interest in this program since
early detection of these failures is expected to significantly reduce the
ensuing damage.
The HMSRE framework consists of engine level anomaly parameter
algorithms working in parallel with the current redline, FASCOS, and SAFD
systems to further extend SSME failure coverage and provide even earlier
detection for many failures. The HMSRE complements existing systems by
providing sensitivity to a wider variety of failure indications. For
example, redlines are sensitive to failures indicated by a large change in a
single parameter, SAFD reacts to failures resulting in smaller, but
significant, changes in several parameters, FASCOS (or RASCOS) detects
abnormally high turbopump vibrations, and HMSRE is sensitive to failures
indicated by weighted combinations of multiple sensor deviations
making HMSRE sensitive to subtle changes in a moderate number of
parameters or large changes in only a few. Each system provides some
unique advantages to the overall engine protection scheme, but a large
degree of overlap also exists. Therefore, in addition to providing
increased sensitivity to a wide range of early failure signatures, the
overall observability of the system is increased. The SSME measurements
used by each system and the basic failure detection strategies are
represented in Figure 1-1 which shows the overall SSME protection
strategy.
While each of these approaches offers some advantages and will provide
the earliest indication for some failures, the system defined by the
HMSRE framework provides the greatest overall utility in both failure
coverage and earliness of detection.
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SECTION 2 - PROGRAM OVERVIEW
The purpose of this program was to synthesize a frame,york, or conceptual
structure, for a health management system for rocket engines (HMSRE) and
develop a plan for a breadboard implementation of the HMSRE. It is based
on existing and/or near term technologies to enable ground testing within
five years. Although the HMSRE will be used initially to support SSME
ground tests, the design of the system does not preclude eventual
utilization on SSME flights.
The program was divided into 4 tasks:
Task 1: Identification of Failure Modes,
Task 2: Methods to Detect and Minimize Damage,
Task 3: Framework for Health Management, and
Task 4: Plan for Breadboard Implementation.
In Task 1, the SSME failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and failure
history were reviewed to identify critical SSME failure modes. A figure
of merit (F.O.M.) was established and used to quantitatively rank the
failure modes. Sensors expected, or observed in the failure history, to
indicate each of the 45 highest ranked failure modes were identified.
In Task 2, damage minimization methods (compatible with the Block-II
SSMEC) were evaluated. Failure detection methods, that address the types
of failures identified in Task 1, were evaluated to characterize near term
applicability to the SSME and general effectiveness of each.
Task 3 combined promising elements of the failure detection methods,
evaluated in Task 2, and synthesized an HMSRE framework. The
effectiveness of the framework was evaluated against current detection
systems. In addition, a basic algorithm was coded and the conceptual
HMSRE strategy was demonstrated for three SSME failures.
Finally, Task 4 generated an implementation plan for the development of
the proposed HMSRE framework.
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SECTION 3 -
MODES
RANKING AND CHARACTERIZATION OF SSME FAILURE
The effort described in this section consists of evaluation of poten_;al
SSME failure modes and identification of those failure modes most likely
to occur. The SSME failure modes were ranked and characterized to (1)
assist in definition of HMSRE system requirements and limitations and
(2) to serve as a database for the development of failure detection
techniques and system frameworks.
3.1 QUALITATIVE RANKING OF FAILURE MODES
The goal of this task is to qualitatively rank the SSME failure mod¢_
according to relative risk to the engine.
The critical failure modes of the SSME have been assessed previously (ref.
3) based on a review of the revised SSME Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis and Critical Items List (FMENCIL), performed in 1987 and issued
on 10/23/87. This assessment, the Critical Item Ordinal Ranking of the
SSME (CIOR-SSME), was performed using NASA instructions which were to
be applied to the entire NSTS on a uniform basis. The assessment used a
subjective categorization procedure which yielded an ordinal ranking cf
all Critical Items.
The failure mode information collected for the ordinal ranking study was
deemed a suitable database for the HMSRE quantitative ranking of failure
modes.
Review of the data contained within the ordinal ranking study resulted in
the following decisions: (1) determine a methodology which can resu't in
a cardinal ranking of the failure modes in order to establish their relative
magnitude of importance; (2) employ Quantitative Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (QRA or PRA) methods using the already existing subjective
assessment results as inputs; and (3) only the criticality 1, loss of
vehicle, failure modes were to be considered.
FIGURE QF MERIT pROCESS (FOM)
The FOM process uses a probabilistic approach with expert judgments as
inputs. This is in the line of Bayesian reasoning which is extensively used
in QRA. In Bayesian reasoning, probabilities are associated with
individual events and not merely sequences of events. Since probabilities
of failure modes are not known, they ar_3 substituted by subjective
5
estimates of the likelihood of occurrence. The probability of a worst case
event to occur is divided into three probability parts which, in turn, are
determined by aggregation of attributes. The attributes are the products
of weighting factors, and of discrete factors (1 or 0) which express the
existence or non-existence of the attributes. The weighting factors were
determined by a survey of expert opinions from SSME test operations,
SSME systems engineering, SSME controls and monitoring). The discrete
attribute factors were obtained from the CIOR-SSME. The probabilities
were normalized and combined to produce a single value as discussed in
the next sections.
All Criticality 1 events were subjected to this subjective probability
calculation and ranked according to their risk (highest risk equals highest
rank).
EEEET__T_BEE
Any quantitative method of determining risk is based on the usual
engineering definition of risk as the product of failure probability and
failure consequence. Since most of the CIL events (i.e., 310 out of over
400) had "engine and vehicle loss" as the worst consequence, the analysis
was restricted to these worst cases. Therefore, the consequence for each
event is the same; and the risk quantification reduces to a probability
quantification.
In order to aid the visualization of the probabilistic approach, an event
tree for SSME Criticality 1 failures was constructed (Figure 3-1). This
event tree is similar to those extensively used at Rocketdyne for nuclear
reactor safety analyses. The event tree in Figure 3-1 shows the
propagation of failure events which is necessary to lead to the
consequence listed in the right column. During normal operation, a
probability of PB exists that an initiating event occurs. Given an
initiating event occurs, a probability PC exists that the initiating event
progresses to the worst case, barring protection by design measures.
Given the initiating event occurs and propagation to worst case has
started, a probability PD exists that protection measures fail. The
overall, or aggregated, probability for the worst case scenario is
therefore the product of the first probability, PB, and the conditional
probabilities PC and PD.
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7
The three probability elements are determined from subjective judgments
and actual experience. This is discussed in the following paragraphs.
PROBABILITY OF INITIATING EVENT
Figure 3-2 depicts how the individual subjective judgments and test
history are combined using a "probabilistic tree" (similar to a fault tree).
The top two branches are the inherent probability that the initiating event
occurs (PBi), made up of "design confidence" and "failure observation", and
the probability that the initiating event is not detected during inspection
(PBd). PBi is determined by the probability that there is insufficient
design confidence (weighted once) or there have been failures observed
(weighted twice), given that there is no testing/inspection on an as-
needed basis. Inspections are conservatively estimated to sucessfully
identify 10% of initiating events, therefore, PBd equals 1.0 if no
inspections are performed and 0.9 if appropriate inspections are
implemeted. The overall probability of an initiating event occuring during
a hot-fire test is the product of PBi and PBd.
All probability attributes were first weighted (Wn) and then multiplied by
a discrete factor,Bn, noting that they either exist (Bn=l) or do not exist
(Bn=0). The weighting factors aru to be understood as "allocated
probability weights", as determined by an expert opinion survey of six
Rocketdyne engineering specialists.
The factors Bn and D10 were obtained from the previously cited CIRA
document. All discrete factors for the 310 failure modes ranked highest
in the CIRA document are summarized in binary form. The top 37 are
shown in Figure 3-3. The five attributes for "insufficient design
confidence" are all possible; therefore, that part of the probability PB was
normalized by dividing by the sum of the weights. The three attributes for
"failure observed" are mutually exclusive; therefore, this part of PB was
normalized to a range of 0 to 1 by dividing the weighted sum (which only
includes one of the three possible scenarios) by the maximum possible
weight. Therefore, the worst case scenario (BS) is normalized to 1.0
while the other scenarios represent _ess risk and have correspondingly
lower, weighted values.
8
PROBABILITY OF EVENT PROPAGATION
Figure 3-4 presents the probability tree for event propagation to worst
case. The two branches of the probability that the event propagates to the
worst case (PC) consists of the existence of propagation factors
(weighted once), combined by an "or" with the existence of a failure
history (weighted twice). Again, the allocated probability weights were
determined by expert opinion, and the discrete C-factors were those
contained in the binary summary. Normalization was obtained by dividing
by the sum of weights for propagation factors, and by the maximum
weight for the mutually exclusive failure history attributes. The
maximum possible value for PC is 1.0; the minimum value is 0.
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PROBABILITY OF PROTECTION FAILURE
Figure 3-5 shows the probability ",ree for protection failure. The two
branches of the probability that failure occurs due to lack of protection
(PD) consist of the fact that no redundancy exists and that no redline
parameter is measured. The two facts exacerbate each other and are
therefore comb{ned multiplicatively. The attributes of no redundancy are
listed in ascending order of their potential contribution to a failure.
These attributes are mutually exclusive within the design approach of the
SSME. The magnitude of their weights was determined by considering that
simple hardware, software or functional redundancy decreases failure
probabilities by one or two orders of magnitude. Redundancies were
considered to be a more effective protection device than redlines. The
maximum possible value for PD is 1.0; the minimum value is lx10 -5. Only
45 failure modes fall into the category where the failure probability is
mitigated by either redundancy or redline parameters.
RESULTS OF FAILURE MODE RANKING BY FOM
The three probabilities were combined multiplicatively, as indicated in
Figure 3-1. An example of the FOM methodology is shown in Figure 3-6.
The top part of Figure 3-6 indicates data for CIL number A150-01. The
numerical results of the three equations for PB, PC and PD were
multiplied and gave 0.713 for overall normalized failure probability. This
represents the failure mode with the highest criticality as defined by the
F.O.M. process. Attachment 1 presents the ranking results of all 310
criticality 1 failure modes. The failure modes, and corresponding rank, are
shown for each LRU in Attachment 2.
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Due to rounding of numbers, the highest ranked failure mode listed in
Attachments 1 and 2 has a slightly different probability estimate (0.695)
compared to that of the example in Figure 3-6 (0.714).
In the final ranking list (Attachment 1), the 40 highest ranked failure
modes using the FOM procedure include the 20 highest CIRA-ranked failure
modes; however, in a different order.
3.2 CHARACTERIZATION OF HIGHEST RANKED FAILURE MODES
The 45 highest ranked (most likely) failure modes were selected to
repJ'esent the failure scenarios expected on the SSME. These failure
modes were characterized to provide a database of failure indications for
subsequent detection method and framework efforts.
Each failure mode was characterized by identifying 1) possible causes,
2) possible effects, 3) correlated test cases, and 4) available sensors
expected to indicate the failure. Possible causes for each failure mode
were identified in the SSME FMENCIL documentation. Possible effects
were determined through the SSME FMENCIL and consultation with SSME
test operations and system engineers. SSME incident test cases were
correlated to specific failure modes on the basis of failure indication
(rather than root cause). For example: Failure A340-02 is a nozzle fuel
leak, a failure that in many cases results from an earlier failure. A test
case is considered correlated to this failure mode if a nozzle leak occurs
at any point during the failure sequence. This is appropriate since the
purpose of the effort is to characterize observable anomalies that
indicate a failure, regardless of the cause. Finally, by examining
ccrrelated test cases and through consultation with SSME test operations
personnel, available sensors expected to provide failure indications were
identified. The results of this effort are summarized in Attachment 3 for
each failure mode. Summaries of each test case can be found in the SAFD
Phase ! Report (ref. 1).
3.3 IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH PAYOFF FAILURE MODES
The 45 most likely failure modes (as determined by the figure of merit
process) were evaluated on the basis of detectability and damage
minimization potential. The objective of the failure mode classification
was to systematically evaluate the most likely, critical failure modes
(identified in Task 1) to determine which of those, if addressed as part of
the HMSRE, had the highest potential for improving engine protection.
16
The methodology used for the failure mode classification is shown in
Figure 3-7. Th=ae key issues influencing the effectiveness of HMSRE
implementation were addressed: 1) detectability (Phase I), availability of
detailed failure signatures (Phase II), and effectiveness of current
detection systems (Phase III).
Phase I - Failure Mode Detectability
The primary goal for phase I was to determine which of the 45 highest
ranked failure modes were likely to provide early failure indications. The
rationale behind the phase I sort is that failure modes with no detectable,
early failure indications (anomalies) provide no basis for early detection.
The possibility of early indications was determined using two
complementary sources of data: 1) detailed evaluation of the available
test history, and 2) an assessment of each failure mode's propagation
scenario by SSME test operations personnel.
Based on the investigation results, the failure modes were grouped
according to the likelihood of detectable, early indications and the
availability of related test histories. The failure modes were placed into
one of four categories:
1. failure modes with expected anomalies and no related test history.
2. failure modes with expected anomalies and related test history.
3. failure modes with no expected anomalies and a related test history.
4. failure modes with no expected anomalies and no related test history.
Those failure modes judged to provide no early failure indications and
having no related test history were eliminated from further evaluation. In
addition, the test data was evaluated for the one failure mode with a test
history and no expected anomaly (B400-22) and no early warnings were
identified. Therefore, this test was also eliminated from further
evaluation.
The results of the phase I investigation are shown in Table 3.1. Of the
total 45 failure mr, des: 13 were in the first category, 17 in the second, 1
in the third, and 14 in the fourth.
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TABLE 3.1 FAILURE MODE SORT - ANOMALIES AND TEST HISTORY
ANOMALIES EXPECTED, NO TEST HISTORY
Rnk LRU-FIV
9 B600-06
10 B400-03
15 A330-02
16 K103-01
18 D300-01
2O B800-06
22 E150-14
24 B400-23
27 K203-01
39 D300-03
40 A700-02
43 B400-18
45 B200°23
Component
LPFTP
HPOTP
MCC
LPFTP DUCT
ANTI-FLOOD VL\
LPOTP
CCV ACT.
HPOTP
OX BLD FLX LIN
ANTI-FLOOD VL\
OPB
HPOTP
HPFTP
Failure Mode
FUEL LEAKAGE PAST LIFT-OFF SEAL.
TURBINE BLADE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
FUEL LEAKS INTO THE CLOSED CAVITY (LINER & JACKET)
FAILS TO CONTAIN HYDROGEN
LEAKAGE DURING PROPELLANT CONDITIONING.
LOSS OF SUPPORT AND POSITION CONTROL.
SEQUENCE VALVE LEAKS - CNTRL PRESSURANT DOWNSTREAM
TURBINE PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO CONTAIN OXIDIZER.
LOW FLOW RESTRICTED OR SHUT OFF.
LOSS OF FUEL TO ASI.
LOSS OF COOLANT TO BEARINGS.
LOSS OF BALANCING CAPAB ILITY.
ANOMALIES EXPECTED, RELATED TEST HISTORY
Component FailureMode
COIL FRACTURE/LEAKAGE-
Rnk LRU-FM
1 A150°01 HEX
2 C200-11 PCA
3 B200-04 HPFTP
4 A340-02 NOZZLE
5 Dl10-01 MFV
6 A600-04 FPB
7 B200-15 HPFTP
8 A200-06 MAIN INJ
11 B400-14 HPOTP
12 B400-07 HPOTP
13 A200-0cJ MAIN INJ
25 A3,30-0,3 MCC
32 C200-0"_ PCA
36 B400-13 HPOTP
37 B200-07 HPFTP
41 B200-1E HPFTP
42 B200-17 HPFTP
FAILURE TO SUPPLY HELIUM PRESSURANT.
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF TURBINE BLADES.
EXTERNAL RUPTURE.
INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
NON-UNIFORMITY OF FUEL FLOW IN THE INJECTION ELEMENT
LOSS OF SUPPORT OR POSITION CONTROL.
LOX POST CRACK.
LOSS OF AXIAL BALANCING FORCE.
FAILURE TO TRANSMIT TORQUE.
INTERPROPELLANT PLATE CRACKS.
INTERNAL RUPTURE AT THE MCC NOZZLE INTERFACE.
INSUFFICIENT OR NO NITROGEN PURGE FLOW
LOSS OF SUPPORT, POSITION CONTROL, ROTORDYNAMIC STABILITY
TURBINE DISCHARGE FLOW BLOCKAGE.
LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW TO TURBINE BEARINGS.
LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW TO TURBINE DISCS.
NO ANOMALIES EXPECTED I RELATED TEST HISTORY
Rnk LRU-FM Component Failure Mode
14 B400-22 HPOTP PUMP PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
iRnk LRU-FIV
17 D500-0E
19 K106-02
21 iA200-07
23 _D220-0E
26 B200-26
28 D120-05
29 A050-02
30 A600-11
31 D120-0_
33 A200-05
34 D130-0_
35 D120-0E
38 B400-2C
44 B200-24=
NO ANOMALIES
Component
GOX CNTL VLV
HP FUEL DUCT
MAIN INJ
OX BLD VLV
HPF-rP
MOV
POWERHEAD
FPB
MOV
MAIN INJ
FPOV
MOV
HPOTP
HPFTP
EXPECTED I NO TEST HISTORY
FailureMode
MAINTAIN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY.
FALLS TO CONTAIN HYDROGEN
EXTERNAL RUPTURE.
FRETTING OF INTERNAL PARTS.
STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
SHELL OR PROPELLANT DUCT RUPTURE.
EXTERNAL RUPTURE.
STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
PARTIAL BLOCKAGE OF AN OXIDIZER ORIFICE.
SHAFT SEAL LEAK.
FREETING OF INTERNAL PART_;.
LOSS OF COOLANT TO 1st & 2nd STAGE TURBINE COMPONENTS.
FAILURE TO RESTRAIN SHAFT MOVEMENT at TURBOPUMP STARTUP
19
Phase II Availability of Detailed Failure Signatures
The goal of Phase II was to determine which of the 45 highest ranked
failure modes had correlated test data that could be used for development
of HMSRE algorithms. Correlated test data enables detailed failure
signatures to be identified for the associated failure mode and increases
the likelihood of successful algorithm development.
Only those failure modes with an expected anomaly were evaluated during
Phase II. (The possibility of a failure mode with no expected anomaly
actually having an indication in the test data was considered but was not
observed.) The failure modes were classified into two categories:
Test Class A - Failure modes for which an anomaly was
expected and correlated test data was identified.
Test Class B - Failure modes for which an anomaly was
expected but no correlated test data could be
identified.
The failure modes which had no related test history identified in Phase I
were automatically classified as Class B failure modes. Those which had
a related test history were evaluated to determine if the failure history
provided sufficient data to characterize the failure signature of the
associated failure mode. If sufficient data seemed to exist, the failure
mode was designated Class A. Otherwise, it was designated as a Class B
failure mode.
The results of the Phase II investigation are shown in Table 3.2. Of the 30
failure modes, correlated hot-fire test data was available for 11.
Phase III - Effectiveness of Current Detection Systems
The goal of Phase III was to estimate the effectiveness of existing
detection systems for detection and minimization of engine damage for
the failure modes under consideration. This factor enables the payoff of
HMSRE implementation to be estimated for each failure mode. In other
words, the greatest payoff will be achieved with an HMSRE that addresses
failure modes which are not adequately detectable with existing systems.
Little benefit is realized with detection of failure modes adequately
protected against with existing systems.
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TABLE 3.2 FAILURE MODE SORT - CORRELATED TEST DATA
TEST CLASS A: CORRELATED TEST DATA
Component Failure Mode
m o
Rnk
1
3
4
5
6
8
13
36
37
41
42
LRU-F_
A150-01 HEX
B200-04 HPFTP
A340-02 NOZZLE
D110-01 MF'V
A600-04 FPB
A200-06 MAIN INJ
A200-0g MAIN INJ
B400-13 HPOTP
B200-07 HPFTP
B200-1_ HPFTP
B200-17 HPFTP
COIL FRACTURE/LEAKAGE.
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF TURBINE BLADES.
EXTERNAL RUPTURE.
INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
NON-UNIFORMITY OF FUEL FLOW IN THE INJECTION ELEMENT
LOX POST CRACK.
INTERPROPELLANT PLATE CRACKS.
LOSS OF SUPPORT, POSITION CONTROL, ROTORDYNAMIC STABILITY
TURBINE DISCHARGE FLOW BLOCKAGE.
LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW TO TURBINE BEARINGS.
LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW TO TURBINE DISCS.
TEST CLASS B: NO CORRELATED TEST DATA
Component Failure ModeIRnk
2
7
9
10
11
12
15
16
18
20
22
24
25
27
32
39
4o
43
45
L.RU-FI_
C200-11
B200-15
B600-0E
B400-03
B400-14
B400-07
A330-02
K103-01
D300-01
B800-0_
E15O-14
B40O-23
A330-03
K203-01
C200-0_
D300-03
A700-02
r,B400-18
B200-23
PCA
HPFTP
LPFTP
HPOTP
HPOTP
HPOTP
MCC
LPFTP DUCT
ANTI-FLOOD VL_
LPOTP
CCV ACT,
HPOTP
MCC
OX BLD FLX LIN
PCA
ANTI-FLOOD VL_
OPB
HPOTP
HPFTP
FAILURE TO SUPPLY HELIUM PRESSURANT.
LOSS OF SUPPORT OR POSITION CONTROL.
FUEL LEAKAGE PAST LIFT-OFF SEAL.
TURBINE BLADE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
LOSS OF AXIAL BALANCING FORCE.
FAILURE TO TRANSMIT TORQUE.
FUEL LEAKS INTO THE CLOSED CAVITY (LINER & JACKET)
FAILS TO CONTAIN HYDROGEN
LEAKAGE DURING PROPELLANT CONDITIONING.
LOSS OF SUPPORT AND POSITION CONTROL.
SEQUENCE VALVE LEAKS - CNTRL PRESSURANT DOWNSTREAM
TURBINE PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
iNTERNAL RUPTURE AT THE MCC NOZZLE INTERFACE.
FAILS TO CONTAIN OXIDIZER.
INSUFFICIENT OR NO NITROGEN PURGE FLOW
LOW FLOW RESTRICTED OR SHUT OFF.
LOSS OF FUEL TO ASI.
LOSS OF COOLANT TO BEARINGS.
LOSS OF BALANCING CAPABILITY.
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Failure modes contained in test classes A" and B were evaluated to
determine how effectively tl'ey would be detected with existing health
monitoring and fault detectmn systems. The systems evaluated were
redline monitoring, SAFD, and FASCOS. In each case a grade was assigned
to each failure mode for each of the health monitoring and fault detection
systems considered.
Grading was based on the degree of engine damage expected to occur when
detected by each system, according to the following scale:
1. Not detectable
2. Detectable - No Reaction Time
3. Detectable - Serious Damage (Engine Level)
4. Detectable - Moderate Damage (Component Level)
5. Detectable - Minor Damage (Sub-component Level)
6. Detectable- No Damage
The results of this evaluaticn are shown in Table 3.3. The estimated
effectiveness of SAFD, FASCOS, and redlines are indicated in columns 1, 2,
and 3. Column 4 indicates the highest level of protection available if all
of these systems are active. Detection of a failure mode, with the
detection systems evaluated, was defined to be adequate if at least one of
the existing systems was expected to detect the failure and cause engine
shutdown with only minor damage (grade 5). These failure modes were
classified as Detection Class B failure modes. Otherwise, the failure
modes were classified as Detection Class A failure modes, indicating that
the existing detection systems were inadequate for that specific failure
mode. The Detection Class determined for each failure mode is shown in
Table 3.3 under the DETECT. heading. Existing failure detection methods
were estimated to be adequate (B) for 10 of the failure modes. The TEST
column indicates the test class (see Table 3.2) of each failure mode.
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TABLE 3.3 -EXISTING FAILURE PROTECTION EFFECTIVENESS
::Ink LRU-FIV SAFD REDLINES FASCOS BEST. AVAIL DETECT. TEST
1 A150-01
2 C200-11
3 B200-04
4 A340-02
5 Dl10-01
6 A600-04
7 B200-15
8 A200-06
9 B600-06
10 B400-_
11 B400-14
12 B400-07
13
16 K103-01
18 D300-01
20 B800-0E
22i-'.150-14
B400-_
271 K203-01
32 C200-07
36 B400-13
37 B200-07
39 D300-03
40 A700-02
41 B200-16
42 B200-17
43 B400-18
45 B200-23
1 3 1 3 A A
1 1 1 1 A B
3 <3 3 3 A A
4 5 1 5 B A
2 5 1 5 B A
1 3 1 3 A A
1 1 3.5 3.5 A B
4 3 1 4 A A
1 1 1 1 A B
1 1 4 4 A B
1 1 4 4 A B
4 3 3 4 A B
4 3 1 4 A A
4 5 1 5 B B
4 1 1 4 A B
5 1 1 5 B B
1 3 4 4 A B
1 3 3 3 A B
1 3 1 3 A B
1 3 3 3 A B
1 1 1 1 A B
1 1 1 1 A B
4 1 3.5 4 A A
4 3 1 4 A A
5 3 1 5 B B
5 4 1 5 B B
5 1 3 5 B A
5 1 3 5 R A
5 1 4 5 B B
5 3 3 5 B B
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Overall Failure Mode Classifications
The result of the failure mode classification is that each of the 45 most
likely failure modes that has an expected anomaly is classified into one of
the four categories defined below:
Class AA: These failure modes are not adequately protected against with
existing detection systems. Therefore, HMSRE implementation of a
detection scheme capable of more rapid detection has the potential for
significant payoff. In addition, hot-fire test data has been correlated to
each failure mode enabling greater confidence in detailed signature
definition and increasing the likelihood of effective algorithm
development.
Class AB: These failure modes are not adequately protected against with
existing detection systems. Therefore, HMSRE implementation of a
detection scheme capable of more rapid detection has the potential for
significant payoff. However, no hot-fire test data has been correlated to
the failure modes; and effective algorithm development is somewhat
uncertain.
Class BA: These failure modes are adequately protected against with
existing detection systems. Therefore, HMSRE implementation of a
detection scheme capable of more rapid detection has little potential for
significant payoff. Hot-fire test data has been correlated to each failure
mode enabling greater confidence in detailed signature definition and
increasing the likelihood of effective algorithm development.
Class BB: These failure modes are adequately protected against with
existing detection systems. Therefore, HMSRE implementation of a
detection scheme capable of more rapid detection has little potential for
significant payoff. No hot-fire test data has been correlated to the
failure modes and effective algorithm development is somewhat
uncertain.
The overall classification of each failure mode is shown in Table 3.4. Of
the 30 failure modes evaluated, 7 were classified as AA, 13 as AB, 4 as
BA, and 6 as BB.
The seven failure modes classified as AA were estimated to provide the
highest likelihood of significant payoff if specific detection methods
were implemented as part of the HMSRE. These failure modes are: 1)
fracture and leakage of the heat exchanger coil, 2) structural failure of
turbine blades in the high pressure fuel turbopump, 3) non-uniform fuel
24
flow in the fuel preburner injection elements, 4) cracking of the LOX posts
in the main injector, 5) interpropellent plate cracks in the main .injector,
6) loss of position control in the high pressure oxidizer turbopump, and 7)
blockage of the high pressure fuel turbine discharge.
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TABLE 3.4 FAILURE MODE CLASSIFICATION - LIKELIHOOD OF
EFFECTIVE HMSRE IMPLEMENTATION
CLASS AA FAILURE MODES
Component Failure ModeRnk LRU-Flv
1 A150-01
3 B200-04
6 A600-04
8 A200-0e
13 A200-0g
36 B400-13
37 B200-07
HEX
HPFTP
FPB
MAIN INJ
MAIN INJ
HPOTP
HPFTP
COIL FRACTURE/LEAKAGE.
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF TURBINE BLADES.
NON-UNIFORMITY OF FUEL FLOW IN THE INJECTION ELEMENT
LOX POST CRACK.
INTERPROPELLANT PLATE CRACKS.
LOSS OF SUPPORT, POSITION CONTROL, ROTORDYNAMIC STABILITY
TURBINE DISCHARGE FLOW BLOCKAGE..
Rnk
2
7
9
10
11
12
16
2o
22
24
25
27
32
LRU-FIv
C200-11!
B200-1 .,=
B6OO.-OE
B400-03
B400-14
B400-07
K103-01
B800-06
E150-14
iB400-23
L_o-o_
K203-01
C200-07
Component
PCA
HPFTP
LPFTP
HPOTP
HPOTP
HPOTP
LPFTP DUCT
LPOTP
CCV ACT.
HPOTP
MCC
OX BLD FLX LIN
PC _,
CLASS AB FAILURE MODES
FailureMode
FAILURE TO SUPPLY HELIUM PREsSURANT.
LOSS OF SUPPORT OR POSITION CONTROL.
FUEL LEAKAGE PAST LIFT-OFF SEAL
TURBINE BLADE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
LOSS OF AXIAL BALANCING FORCE.
FAILURE TO TRANSMIT TORQUE.
FAILS TO CONTAIN HYDROGEN
LOSS OF SUPPORT AND POSITION CONTROL,
SEQUENCE VALVE LEAKS - CNTRL PRESSURANT DOWNSTREAM.
TURBINE PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
INTERNAL RUPTURE AT THE MCC NOZZLE INTERFACE.
FAILS TO CONTAIN OXIDIZER.
INSUFFICIENT OR NO NITROGEN PURGE FLOW
CLASS BA FAILURE MODES
Rnk LRU-Fb
4 A340-0_
5 D110-01
41 B200-1E
42 B200-1;
Component
NOZZLE
MFV
HPFTP
HPFTP
Failure Mode
EXTERNAL RUPTURE.
INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW TO TURBINE BEARINGS.
LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW TO TURBINE DISCS.
CLASS BB FAILURE MODES
Component Failure Mode!Rnk LRU-FIV
15 A330-02
18 D300-01
39 D300-_
40 A700-02
43 B400-1E
45 B200-2_
MCC
ANTI-FLOOD VL_
ANTI-FLOOD VL_
OPB
HPOTP
HPFTP
FUEL LEAKS INTO THE CLOSED CAVITY (LINER & JACKET)
LEAKAGE DURING PROPELLANT CONDITIONING.
LOW FLOW RESTRICTED OR SHUT OFF.
LOSS OF FUEL TO ASI.
LOSS OF COOLANT TO BEARINGS.
LOSS OF BALANCING CAPABILITY.
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SECTION 4 - DAMAGE MINIMIZATION TECHNIQUES
The goal of this effort was to define HMSRE actions which most
effectively minimize damage to the engine after a failure is detected. To
ensure near term applicability and compatibility with the current SSME,
the techniques evaluated were limited to those available through the SSME
Block-II controller.
The basic damage minimization actions available to the HMSRE are: 1)
actuator Iockup, 2) downthrust, and 3) shutdown. Evaluation of each
technique led to the conclusion that in a test stand environment (where
damage minimization is the only concern), engine shutdown is the
appropriate HMSRE action whenever a failure is detected. In flight,
however, downthrusting becomes a viable option for extending engine life
and minimizing damage within mission completion constraints.
Each damage minimization action is discussed below.
Actuator Lockuo
Actuator Iockup results in each control actuator being "locked" into its
current position. Two locking mechanisms are available on the SSME,
hydraulic Iockup and electrical Iockup. Hydraulic Iockup is in response to
a loss of hydraulic power. In this case, the hydraulic lines are sealed off;
locking the actuators in their current positions. Electrical Iockup is in
response to unresolvable faults in the controller. New commands are
inhibited, and the actuators are maintained at their current positions.
Actuator Iockup enables the engine to continue firing (although in a
degraded mode) in the event of control system failure, but provides no
damage minimization capabilities beyond those already available through
the action of the Block-II controller.
Eo_w.03J0.u  
Downthrusting minimizes engine strain by reducing pressures,
temperatures, speeds, and vibrations throughout the engine. If damage has
occurred, the damage is likely to continue propagating through the system,
but at a reduced rate. Therefore, in situations where the engine can be
safely shutdown (e.g. on a test stand), the HMSRE would never downthrust
an engine. Engine shutdown at the earliest "probable failure" indication
would minimize damage.
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In flight applications, however, engine shutdown could result in a loss of
mission. In this case it would not be practical to shutdown an engine at
the earliest "probable failure" indication. Two options 3xist in flight: 1)
continue normal operation, or 2) downthrust, when possib;e, to reduce the
rate of failure, propagation. In both cases the engine could still be
shutdown if an impending catastrophic failure is indicated.
The basic strategy for downthrusting an engine would be to downthrust, if
possible, when a "probable failure" is indicated and continue operation
until the mission ends or an impending catastrophic failure is indicated.
Implementation of this capability requires propulsion level coordination
to maintain the required vehicle thrust and manage issues such as: 1)
mission completion requirements, 2) status of other engines, 3) available
abort modes. For example, if mission success requires three engines at
109% tl_rust, an engine indicating a probable failure would not be allowed
to downthrust. However, if mission success requires three engines at
100% thrust, an engine indicating a probable failure could be downthrust
to 82%. The other two engines would be upthrust to 109% to compensate
for the lost thrust. This approach reduces the strain on the engine
indicating a probable failure, without jeopardizing mission success. The
reduced strain and failure propagation rate would result in the minimum
engine damage within the constraints of mission success.
Damage is expected to be minimized in all cases if an engine is shutdown
immediately upon detection of a failure. This action would confine the
existing damage by preventing further propagation of the failure.
The primary shutdown mechanism of the Block-II controller is a hydraulic
shutdown in which the actuators are actively sequenced by the controller.
This mechanism is initiated through a command to the controller and is
completed in just over 5 seconds. A pneumatic shutdown sequence is also
available. The pneumatic shutdown is a passive sequence initiated by a
loss of controller electrical power. The pneumatic system is orificed
such that the passive pneumatic sequence matches the actively controlled
hydraulic sequence. Since the valve sequencing is identical (or very
similar) with either shutdown mechanism, no damage minimization
advantage between them could be established on that basis. However, one
advantage exists in that the hydraulic shutdown system is backed up by
the pneumatic system. Directly initiating a pneumatic shutdown removes
a level of redundancy in the system and offers no benefit to the engine.
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Therefore a commanded hydraulic shutdown was selected as the HMSRE
response to a detected failure.
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5.0 EVALUATION OF METHODS TO DETECT FAILURES
This section discusses the various failure detection techniques evaluated
and considered for inclusion in the HMSRE framework.
5.1 OVERVIEW
The failure detection techniques evaluated during this program can be
divided into nine types:
1. Advanced Redlines
2. Parameter Correlation
3. Analytical Models to Predict Remaining Life
4. Non-Intrusive Measurement Approaches
5. Model Based Failure Detection
6. Data Trending
7. Operational Envelope Based Failure Detection
8. Power Level Dependent Algorithms
9. Vibration Monitoring
The failure detection techniques evaluated were candidates for inclusion
in the HMSRE. The results of these evaluations provided the basis for key
features of the framework described in Section 6.
The techniques were evaluated to identify current SSME applications,
strengths, and weaknesses. In addition, compatibility with the Block-II
SSME was evaluated. The failure detection techniques and evaluation
results are discussed in the following sections.
5.2 ADVANCED REDLINES
Advanced redlines are based on a different philosophy than existing
redlines. The current redlines are defined to be values at which severe
engine damage is inevitable. For example, a temperature redline might be
set at 1800R if the maximum operating temperature of some component is
1825R. This philosophy is fine for avoiding catastrophic engine failures
caused by a specific component failure. However, engine failures go
undetected until this limit is reached, often resulting in considerable
damage.
Advanced redline._, applicable to the HMSRE, set limits on a different
basis. These limits are set such that a significant anomaly, not
3O
necessarily dangerous in itself, is detectable. An example of this might
be a temperature redline set at twice the usual deviation from its nominal
operating poinz. The tighter limits allow a faster response to engine
failures. The major issues with this approach are identification of the
nominal value and definition of a significant anomaly. A "significant
anomaly" obviously must be greater than the expected variation in the
monitored parameter. These variations can be reduced (thereby enabling
tighter limits) by using a longer averaging interval. The averaging
interval selected would try to optimize the trade between signal
smoothness and response time.
Significant anomalies can be readily determined through a statistical
analysis of the redline parameter for both nominal and engine failure test
cases. Nominal values, however, change with power level and differ
significantly between engines. Figures 5-1 to 5-4 show nominal test data
(turbine discharge temperatures) for 8 different engines over the entire
range of power levels. Each data point represents a 1 second average and
is plotted at the corresponding power level. Clearly, in order to
accurately define a nominal value, power level and engine specific
correction strategies must be used.
For example, consider the HPOT discharge temperature (Figure 5-1). An
advanced redline, applicable to all engines and power levels, would have to
be set above 1500R. Assume a value of 1550R is selected. This value is
only about 50R above the highest value expected and would detect
deviations as small as 50R above the nominal value for the high end of the
expected range. However, at lower power and with another engine, the
operating value could be as low as 950R. In this situation a deviation of
600R would be required before the redline is exceeded. Clearly, this
parameter would be better monitored if the engine to engine variation and
power levAI were accounted for.
Some indication of the corrections needed, to accurately define a nominal
value, is provided by the ratio of typical signal noise and engine to engine
deviation (or power level deviations). For example, if a temperature
signal typically deviates by 50R for a single engine, engine to engine
corrections are of little value if the engine to engine variation is only
10R. A ._ummary of this information is shown in Table 5.1 for several
advanced redline candidates. A large signal to noise ratio indicates that
an advanced redline will be more effective if appropriate correction
strategies are applied.
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As shown by Table 5.1, the effectiveness of most redlines would be
greatly enhanced if engine to engine and power level variations are
accounted for in the definition of a no,ninal value.
Power level variations are easily addressed since the changes are
analytically predictable. A power dependent redline could simply be
changed in accordance with the test or flight thrust profile. An example
of what a power level dependent redline might look like is shown in Figure
5-5.
Engine to engine variations are considerably more difficult to predict
analytically since the changes are caused by subtle differences in the
manufactured hardware. Two general approaches have been identified to
address this issue. The first approach is to base the nominal value on
values observed during prior tests of the same engine. It should be noted
that replacement of a line replaceable unit (LRU) may yield different
operating levels and therefore constitutes a different engine. Since LRUs
are routinely changed, this approach has limited applicability.
The second approach is to observe an operating point during the initial
seconds of steady state, and define this value to be nominal. This
approach provides accurate engine specific information even if the engine
has never been fired before. Another advantage is the ability to account
for test to test variations in a parameter. While these variations are not
as large as those between engines or power levels they can be significant.
Figures 5-6 to 5-9 show the test to test turbine discharge temperature
variations for four firings of the same engine. A drawback to this
approach is that failures cannot be detected during the start transient or
the first few seconds of mainstage. However, if the parameter continues
to increase (or decrease) the relatively tight limits set for an advanced
redline would detect the failure shortly after monitoring begins.
Several general considerations, on the use of redlines, should be
addressed. First, a single sensor malfunction should not cause an engine to
shutdown. This would obviously be the case if a redline parameter was
measured by only a single sensor and that sensor began to drift.
Therefore, advanced redlines are limited to those parameters for which
multiple measurements can be obtained. Secondly, confidence that an
engine failure is occurring is relatively small if only one measurement is
indicating an anomaly. Finally, redlines provide possible failure
indications with a minimum of computational time.
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Redlines alone are not adequate for an effective damage minimization
system due to their inherent limitations. However, they could be a
valuable element of a more encompassing detection system by i:,roviding
rapid information at very little computational cost.
5.3 PARAMETER CORRELATION
Early failure indications can be classified into three distinct groups for
analysis: 1) those that are directly observable with available
instrumentation (e.g. increased HPFP speed), 2) those that are not directly
observable, but cause observable changes in the measured parameters
(e.g. loss of HPFP efficiency), and 3) those that are not observable, with
existing instrumentation (e.g. cracked turbine blades).
This section discusses the second group of early failure indications, those
that are not directly observable. Two approaches were evaluated for
estimating these parameters. In the first, the parameter is calculated
from measured parameters. Ideally, this provides an accurate estlmate
of the actual value. However, the calculation is dependent on a complete
set of data and the loss of a single measured parameter (i.e. a sensor
failure) could invalidate the estimate. Since sensor failures are fc,r more
common than other types of failures on the SSME, this represents a major
weakness for the approach.
The second approach for estimating parameters, that are not directly
observable, is to correlate changes in measured parameters. For example,
a loss of HPFP efficiency is expected to result in an increased HPFT
discharge temperature and a decreased HPOT discharge temperature (Since
the degraded HPFTP requires a disproportionately, greater amount of
energy in the turbine to obtain the required pump output). Therefore, if an
increase in the HPFT discharge temperature is measured and a decrease in
the HPOT discharge temperature is measured, a change in the HPFP
efficiency can be postulated and a value approximated. For the class of
failures resulting in degraded HPFP efficiency, the correlated value "HPFP
efficiency" provides an earlier failure indication than either of the turbine
discharge temperatures evaluated individually. This approach is unable to
provide an absolute value for unobservable parameters, but quantitatively
indicates changes. Since failures are generally indicated by changes in
key operating parameters, this is not seen as a deficiency. The major
advantages of this approach are the relatively simple computations
required and insensitivity to sensor failures.
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Correlation of individual sensor values to estimate changes in key engine
operating parameters, for the purpose of failure detection, is a well
established technique used onjet engines known as gas path analysis.
Evidence that multiple failure indications exist and potentially represent
correlated sets for rocket engine failures is obtained by evaluating the
available SSME test history (Figure 5-10). The top section of this figure
represents the direction of the observed changes in individual sensors for
a set of SSME failures. As can be seen for the case of LOX post failure,
which represents the largest group of similar failures, a fair degree of
correlation exists in the observed sensor anomalies. For example, both
turbine discharge temperatures increase in 5 of the 6 failure cases.
Additionally, multiple sensor indications are observed for all cases. In
fact, 8 or more anomalies were seen for 13 of the 21 cases evaluated.
Four specific parameters were evaluated for the HMSRE: 1) HPOTP
efficiency, 2) HPFTP efficiency, 3) MCC combustion efficiency, and 4) Fuel
leakage. The first three represent key engine operating parameters while
fuel leakage provides an example of how correlation of measurable
parameters can be applied to specific failure detection.
Decreases in pump operational efficiency can result from hydraulic
losses, disk friction losses, mechanical losses, and leakage losses.
Similarly, turbine operational efficiency is degraded by nozzle losses,
blade losses, leakage or clearance losses, disk friction losses, and
mechanical losses. Therefore, even though failures that increase these
losses may not be specifically observed, they can be correlated to, and
will be indicated by, efficiency degradations.
Specific correlations between measurable SSME quantities and the
parameters listed above were determined using the SSME engine balance
model. For each of the cases identified, two sets of data were generated.
The first set listed key, measurable SSME quantities using a nominal value
for the "unobservable" parameter. In the second set, a degraded value was
used (e.g. a 5% loss of HPFP efficiency). Differences between these sets
were calculated and tabulated. The model results indicated that definite
correlations exist in the set of SSME measured parameters for each of the
cases evaluated. Complete model results are provided in Attachment 4.
The number of individual sensor anomalies observed for each SSME failure,
the commonality demonstrated for similar failures, and the correlations
predicted by the SSME engine balance model indicate that correlation of
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measured parameters can enhance failure detection by estimating system
level parameters sensitive to a large number of failure modes.
5.4 ANALYTICAL MODELS TO PREDICT REMAINING LIFE
Two classes of analytic life prediction models were identified. The first
class consists of models based on past performance of similar
components and/or calculations of expected life. An example of this
approach is the Automated Cycle Time System (ACTS) used by Rocketdyne
for the SSME. In this case, the number of starts, time at a given
temperature, maximum pressure reached, and. other similar parameters
are recorded for individual components. Each factor is assumed to reduce
the life of a component by a predetermined amount. When the estimated
useful life of a component is expended, the part is inspected and/or
replaced. This system provides valuable maintenance information, but
due to the somewhat inexact nature of the useful life estimates, this
approach is not suitable for real-time monitoring of the engine.
The second class of remaining life models are those that predict
remaining life based on real-time monitoring of some attribute of the
specific component. The actual parameter measured in this approach is
the amount of component degradation, not remaining life. Remaining life
is inferred based on previous experience, calibration tests, or theoretical
relationships. An example of this approach is monitoring specific bearing
frequencies and correlating measured amplitudes to the amount of
degradation in the bearing. While these models are useful in calling
attention to a specific component (for either maintenance or more
thorough evaluation), their use is limited in a real time system, due to the
inability of existing algorithms to provide the confidence and resolution
required for real time decisions. The confidence and resolution of these
models increase as the failure becomes more immediate. Therefore, one
possible scheme to use these models may be to issue a shutdown command
if a failure is imminent. The "time before failure" when an engine cutoff
command is issued could be gradually extended as the algorithm is refined
and confidence is gained in the results.
Analytical remaining life model_ may provide early engine cutoff for
specific component failures, but are too limited in scope to provide an
adequate damage minimization system. These models are best utilized to
address specific problems not adequately covered by a more
comprehensive failure detection scheme.
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5.5 NON-INTRUSIVE MEASUREMENT APPROACHES
Benefits of these sensors include greater accuracy since they do not
perturb what they try to measure and less physical restriction since
they do not require a mechanical interface for the measurement.
Consequently, they should be relatively simple to implement with minimal
hazard to the existing engine. Some of these sensors are unique in that
they can be ground-based and monitor the engine during test on a stand
and possibly during the first minutes of flight. Sensors which do not
require any modification of the engine or engine components also save
time and money that would be spent on redesign end evaluation of the new
design for safety and operational verification.
This section discusses advanced instrumentation concepts which might
be suitable fo'r health and condition monitoring during test stand
operation and eventual flight application.
The sensors listed in Table 5.2 were selected for consideration due to
their potential for health monitoring capabilities. This list was then
pared to four candidates (Table 5.3) based upon the requirements of 1)
minimal program risk, 2) real time anomaly indication, 3) operation
remote from the engine, 4) applicability to unmodified engine, and 5) 4-6
year implementation. Plume tomography, raman spectroscopy, and induced
flourescence were estimated to be unavailable in the 4-6 year time frame
since they are still in the laboratory phase of development. Bearing/shaft
monitoring technologies were deemed Intrusive, requiring either intrusive
instrumentation or alteration to internal engine compone'nts.
Delamination, fatigue, and acoustic measurements (EMAT) are between
flight technologies and are therefore not applicable to a real-time HMSREo
The four candidates: plume emission spectrometry, remote leak
detection, thermography, and acoustic monitoring are discussed in the
following subsections. Plume spectrometry is discussed in the greatest
detail since this technology is well established and is included in the
baseline HMSRE framework. The other three candidates are briefly
discussed. Each represents a potentially significant improvement in
rocket engine health monitoring, but it is felt that none of these systems
are sufficiently developed for implementation under this program.
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5.5.1 Plume Emission Spectrometry
Radiant energy is both emitted and absorbed by
plume gases at wavelengths characteristic of the
present.
material
recorded
spectral
behavior.
of damage, erosion, or wear of engine components. It is manifested by
the erratic behavior of spectral line amplitude as a function of time or
an unusual amplitude of the spectral signature of the material or
materials representative of the component in question. Unique materials
can be traced to the source engine component.
rocket engine exhaust
combustion species
These spectral signatures are uniquely representative of the
makeup of the plume. Each atomic and molecular species is
as its own spectral line, band, or continuous structure within a
record and describes either nominal or anomalous engine
Anomalous behavior evident in the emission spectra is a result
Plume emission spectrometry is a proven technology. Spectrometers are
currently in use at the MSFC test stands for plume monitoring.
Additionally, Rocketdyne has an in house system used for monitoring
engine tests at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL).
Examples of the data available with a plume monitoring system are
provided by the data obtained by Rocketdyne as indicated in Table 5.4.
Characteristic spectra for nominal tests have been determined but
anomaly thresholds still need to be established. Some failure data has
been recorded and emission spectra from events such as engine hardware
erosion, and foreign material contamination stand in marked contrast to
the spectra normally seen during engine hot-firings. Also shown in Table
5.4 is a list of plume anomalies observed during 100 plus recorded tests
along with the materials exhibiting anomalous behavior. A more
complete list of materials observed in the plumes, and possible sources
of contamination, is shown in Table 5.5. Attachment 5 presents a list of
SSME failure modes expected to show plume anomalies and the materials
expected.
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TABLE 5.2 ROCKETDYNE ADVANCED INSTRUMENTATION
APPLICABLE TO SSME
TECHNOLOGY
LEAK DETECTION
SPECTROMETRY - PLUME
EMISSION/ABSORPTION
TRACKING
TOMOGRAPHY
RAMAN
PLANAR LASER INDUCED FLOURESCENCE
THERMOG RAPHY/PYROMETRY
PLUME
NOZZLE
ENGINE
BEARING/SHAFT MONITORING
ACCELEROMETERS/STRAIN
ISOTOPE
DELAMINATION/CRACK DETECTION
FATIGUE DETECTION
ACOUSTICS
ELECTROMAGNETIC ACOUSTIC TRANSDUCER
Preflight
O
O
O
0
0
0
0
APPLICABILITY
In-Flight
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Test Stand
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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TABLE 5.3 NON-INTRUSIVE MEASUREMENT CANDIDATES
TECHNOLOGY
LEAK DETECTION
SPECTROMETRY - PLUME
EMISSION/ABSORPTION
THERMOG RAPHY/PYROMETRY
PLUME
NOZZLE
ENGINE
ACOUSTICS
APPLICABILITY
Preflight In-Flight
• •
0
0
• •
0
0
Test Stand
0
0
0
0
0
0
5O
While the principle of analyzing plume emitted radiant energy is not new,
the adaptation of digitized plume data to real-time processing is required
for safety/damage minimizatior:, systems. Rocketdyne has done this with
the in-house spectrometry system. This system scans from the near-
ultraviolet (UV) to the near-infrared (IR), and has been interfaced to a
PC-AT type computer. The computer executes programmed data
acquisition and orchestrates analysis of the data. Control signals and
data are transferred via an IEEE bus. The spectrometer has software
selectable spectral scan times as small as 10 ms, internal analog to 14
bit digital conversion, and a 4 Megabyte RAM memory. These
capabilities allow automated evaluation of plume spectra and the capture
of transient engine events. A pictorial description of spectrum analysis
is shown in Figure 5-11. The recorded data is used to produce two types
of graphs. The first is a plot of intensity versus wavelength also
plotted against time (Waterfall Plot) as in Figure 5-12, while the second
is a plot of the intensity of a specific spectral line against time as in
Figure 5-13. These two types of plots are useful in identifying and
characterizing key features of the spectra.
Of the one hundred plus tests observed in the past three years, four are
of particular note. During an OTV test, in January of 1987, a fuel
turbopump bearing seized. Material from the damaged cage is clearly
seen in Figures 5-12 and 5-13 (as CaOH) prior to the redline cutoff of the
engine. A similar event befell an SSME development engine in April of
the same year when an oxidizer turbopump bearing seized. The second
example shows what was observed when a large piece of copper tape,
used during a leak check procedure, is left inside the main combustion
chamber (see Figure 5-14). Even though the tape quickly burned away, the
spectrometry system was able to record increased levels of copper
compounds in the plume. The key aspect of this test is validation that
copper is detectable and identification of compounds created. This is key
to SSME combustion device failure detection since several key combustion
device components (e.g. baffles) are made from copper alloys. The third
example was a high speed view of the SSME startup transient that
showed foreign material contamination flushed from the engine. A
fourth example shows preburner faceplate erosion caused by a
purposely bent injector post. In this test, chromium is readily observed
in the plume. Other structural materials were also indicated though not
as strongly as the chromium spectral line. All of these examples serve to
characterize the spectral signatures of foreign materials within the
plume.
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The plume spectrometry system has proven capability to provide failure
information, not otherwise available, and therefore represents an unique
asset to a failure detection system.
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TABLE 5.5 OBSERVED SPECTRAL FEATURES IN SSME PLUMES
SPECIES
Wa
K
CaOH
OH
Li
Ca
CoO
Ni/OH
Cr
Fe
Sr
SrOH
WAVELENGTH OCCURRENCES PERCENTAGE OF POSSIBLE
(nm) IN 28 TESTS OCCURRENCE SOURCE
589.0/589.6 28 100 Propellants
404.4/404.7 11 39 Propellants
766.5/769.9 2B 100
555 28 100 Propellants,
603 26 93 Bearing Cages
623 28 100
645 2B 100
306.4 28 100 O=/H= Combustion
670.8 28 lO0 Dry Film Lube
422.? 24 86 Propellants,
Bearing Cages
420-430 23 82 Propellants,
Bearing Cages
341-352 16 S7
425-428/520.6 11 39
371-375/386 II 39
460.7 l 4
606/682 1 4
Cu0H 537 1 4
CuH
Cu
428-433 1 4
324.8/327.4/510.6 l
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5.5.2 External Leak Detection
Two general methods are being developed for performing external leak
detection of propellents on rocket engines, mass spectrometry and optical
measurements. With current technology, neither system meets the
requirements for a real-time, SSME failure detection system as defined in
this program. For early detection, a small propellent leak must be
identified and the source isolated (e.g. a leak in the powerhead is worse
than a nozzle leak). Mass spectrometry provides accurate detection of
propellent gasses but is unable to isolate the source of leakage. Optical
measurements, on the other hand, provide an image of the engine and
enable isolation of leaks, but are currently unable to accurately detect
propellent gases. A brief discussion of optical methods is presented
below to illustrate the development currently underway to enable
detection of propellent gases.
During flight or on a test stand, the gases available for leak detection
are 02, H2, and H20. Radiant emission and absorption bands for water
and oxygen can be found in the UV and in the near-IR. The near-IR
absorption lines are easily accessed using commercial lasers. The UV
spectrum can be accessed by flash lamps. Rocketdyne has demonstrated
the detection of oxygen to as small as one percent of the ambient
atmosphere using this optical UV method. The H20 leaks of interest would
be comprised of leaking steam and could be monitored with an IR
detector without electromagnetic stimulation from a laser or flash
lamp source. Another promising method for remote monitoring of
propellent leaks is a small Raman scattering system that Rocketdyne is
currently investigating (for hydrogen leaks).
5.5.3 Thermography/Pyrometry
Engine Hardware - Remote thermal monitoring of engine hardware can
aid in the detection of hot gas leaks, hardware cracks, debonds, and
delaminations. Many engine parts are insulated but serious problems may
still be manifest in these areas especially if they involve leaking hot
gases. Hydrogen fires, invisible to the naked eye, can easily be spotted
thermographically. During an SSME test previous to this study,
Rocketdyne thermography detected an external nozzle fire which was
otherwise undetected. Inspection of the hardware after conclusion of the
test verified the fire and the damage caused.
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Plume - Thermographic monitoring of the plume can provide valuable
information regarding plume temperatures. Plume temperatures and
temperature distribution are related to mixture ratio, mixing efficiency,
burn efficiency, and engine stability. Although decisions may not be
made on this information alone, it may provide anomaly information
which corroborates or clarifies other sensor data and which is valuableto
the decision process.
5.5.4 Acoustlc Monltorlng
Acoustic monitoring of the engine may provide information on leaks,
turbopump conditions, engine instability, or other anomalies. Although
the SSME produces approximately 150 decibels of acoustic output, it is
not clear where the spectrum drops off or how quickly it drops. This
should be investigated more completely. Anomaly information may be
provided by signals in spectral regions of low acoustic output from the
engine or from the variation with time of relevant spectral bands.
5.6 MODEL-BASED FAULT DETECTION
Two areas were investigated for this type of failure detection: 1)
analytical sensor redundancy, and 2) model based engine failure detection.
5.6.1 Analytical Sensor Redundancy
There are three approaches to sensor redundancy: 1) hardware, 2)
analytical, and 3) temporal. Hardware redundancy utilizes many sensors
to measure the same variables. In the analytical approach, a model is used
that estimates the required parameter/variable via information of
dissimilar sensors. Temporal redundancy makes use of redundant
information from successive samples of the output of a given sensor to
identify failures. Range and rate checks are common examples of the
latter method.
With analytical redundancy, values of parameters are derived from
mathematical models, based on actual or simulated inputs, and are
compared with the measured values of the corresponding parameters. This
approach provides redundancy through analytically derived information
that is computed on-line real-time and can eliminate the need for
hardware redundancy (or provide redundancy where none currently exists)
in many cases.
6O
In general, one would first study the system observability characteristics
and would prefer a reduced order observer that will function under failed
sensors/actuators. Under these conditions tne system matrices would be
modified to reflect the failed sensor or actuator reductions.
An example of how analytical redundancy could be used to increase the
reliability of a monitoring system is provided by the case of the HPOTP
intermediate seal drain helium pressure. Presently, this parameter is
measured by one pressure transducer with two channels upstream of the
seal. In flight conditions there is no helium flowrate sensor. Thus,
flowrate is inferred from helium bottle pressure, density, skin
temperature and volume. The flowrate is normally at 240 standard cubic
feet per minute and the redline minimum on the pressure is 170 psia. If
the pressure transducer experiences a hard failure (i.e., reads zero or 650
psia), then it is disqualified and the engine operates without a pressure
redline on helium.
However, in order to avoid such dangerous elimination of sensors, there is
an alternate approach that enhances the functional reliability of the
overall engine control system by reconstructing or estimating the critical
signals from dissimilar types of sensors under the assumption of
"sufficient observability." For the pressure sensor of the above mentioned
seal, the pressure can be inferred analytically on-line real-time and
compared with the sensor readings. In case there is a sensor failure, the
analytically redundant sensor can be utilized as backup.
Since many parameters on the SSME are represented by only single
measurements, analytical redundancy provides a means of significantly
improving the reliability of a failure detection system.
Additionally, the same basic approach can be applied to verification of
actuator responses. Input signals to actuators are sometimes not
implemented in a desirable manner, thus producing off-nominal outputs.
Analytical approaches toward the identification of such anomalies
presently exist in the SSME controller. Namely, the Rotary Variable
Differential Transformer (RVDT) output of the actuator signal is compared
to the actuator model output to detect out-of-limit actuator operation.
Moreover, actuator rate changes are monitored via servo-actuation error
indicator interrupts, whereby the vehicle is commanded to shut down in
case of significantly anomalous behavior. Thus, analytical techniques are
currently in use in the SSME controller, providing advantages that enhance
overall engine reliability and performance.
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5.6.2 Model Based Engine Failure Detection
Most model-based methods rely on analytical redundancy. Using present
and/or previous measurements of certain variables in conjunction with
the mathematical model describing their relationship, analytical values
are generated and compared with measured values. The difference
between the analytical and measured values is called a residual. Thus, the
failure detection procedure in the model-based approaches rests on three
tasks: 1) residual generation, 2) statistical testing and signature
generation, and 3) decision making and diagnostics (in case of
identification and isolation).
Model based diagnostics generally are most useful for detection and
identification of specific failure types. Therefore to illustrate the
concept, a fuel leak detection scheme, in which the oxidizer flow is
mathematically modelled, is presented below as an example.
Example: Model Based Fuel Leak Detection
An analytical approach that calculates mixture ratio (of oxygen to
hydrogen) and compares the result with the internally generated mixl.,re
ratio, can determine the existence of leakage in the fuel lines.
Simulations were carried out on the SSME analytical model and leaks were
introduced to evaluate the concept. The results of the simulations
indicate clearly the introduction of leaks in several parameter outputs.
For this study, leaks of 2, 5, and 10 Ib/sec (just downstream of the main
fuel valve) were simulated to demonstrate the potential leak detection
and engine mixture ratio control using the alternate mixture ratio
computation.
A direct approach is taken whereby the oxygen flow calculation is used to
compute the MR in the SSME more accurately, reflecting the effects of a
fuel leak on the various engine parameters. To accurately estimate the
total oxygen flow used by the engine, three paths must be considered: 1)
MCC flow, 2) FPB flow, and 3) OPB flow.
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Oxygen flow from the Main Oxygen Valve (MOV) to the main combustion
chamber is given by the following equation:
1/2
w Pc = 24.2 (Pdo - Pc) ---(1)
where Pdo is the HPOTP discharge pressure and Pc is the main chamber
pressure.
The following equation provides the oxygen flow through the fuel
(hydrogen) preburner:
1/2
w FPB =IPPDO - PFP
I 20.2143 + 116.5/AF
---(2)
where PPDO is the preburner oxygen (boost) pump discharge pressure, PFP
is the fuel preburner pressure, and A F is the fuel preburner oxidizer valve
flow area.
In order to calculate the oxidizer flow through the oxidizer preburner, the
assumption was made that the oxygen and hydrogen preburner pressures
are equal in steady-state conditions. Since the oxidizer preburner
pressure is not measured during flight, the fuel preburner pressure was
used as an estimate.
Table 5.6 shows the ratio of pressure drop from the preburner pump
discharge to the oxidizer preburner to the same pressure drop for the fuel
preburner. The largest variation is 5.5% (65% power level compared to
109% power level). Since the flowrate is proportional to the square root
of pressure drop, the maximum oxidizer preburner flow error is 2.7%. At
65% power level, the oxidizer preburner flow is about 2.5% of the total
oxidizer flow. Therefore, the maximum mixture ratio error is only 0.07%
due to using the fuel preburner pressure for the oxidizer preburner.
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Table 5.6 Ratio of OPB Pressure Drop to FPB Pressure Drop
power level (%) 109 104 100 90 80 70 65
WPoxpb
WPfupb
0.966 0.968 0.970 0.980 0.996 1.1010 1.1020
The equation estimating oxygen flow through the oxidizer preburner is
therefore given by:
1/2
JPP°° JwOPB - _. _ --(3)
1.576 + 2082.6/Ao =
where A o is the oxygen preburner oxidizer valve flow area.
The sum of equations (1), (2), and (3) yields the total oxidizer flow
estimate and MR is calculated by dividing the total oxygen flow by the
total hydrogen (fuel) flow. A flowmeter provides the fuel flow. The
inputs to the oxygen flow calculations require measurements of the main
chamber pressure, HPOTP discharge pressure, fuel preburner pressure,
preburner boost pump discharge pressure, and fuel and oxygen pump
oxidizer valve positions. All of these are available from existing sensor
measurements. These equations were incorporated into the SSME digital
transient model to verify the feasibility of the concept of leak detection.
The results of a computer simulation of the engine dynamics of the SSME
indicated that the approach proposed herein is valid during steady-state
operation. Table 5.7 shows how closely the oxidizer flow as calculated,
using the alternate approach, agrees with the design value at steady-state
conditions, for five different power levels.
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Table 5.7
and
Comparison Between Analytical
Design Values
Oxidizer Flow Model
power level (%)
OX flow design value
OX flow as calculated
using analytical model
109 104 100 90 65
975.58 931.28 895.85 807.17 584.82
976.41 930.99 895.77 805.88 582.25
A simulated fuel leak was introduced into the model between the High
Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) and the main fuel valve and the
analytical model was used to calculate MR. One computer simulation was
run under nominal operating conditions and three runs were made under 2
Ib/sec, 5 Ib/sec, and 10 Ib/sec fuel leaks. The results are shown in
Figures 5-15 and 5-16. Figure 5-15 shows the calculated MR, using the
analytical model to determine oxidizer flow. Figure 5-16 shows the
current SSME mixture ratio calculation.
As can be seen from these plots, for a given point in time, calculated MR
generally increases using the model based MR estimate, and generally
decreases using the current SSME MR estimate for increasingly greater
fuel leaks. Figure 5-16 indicates that the mixture ratio is lower for
increasingly greater fuel leaks when in fact the mixture ratio should be
higher for increasingly greater fuel leaks, as Figure 5-15 indicates.
Differences between the values obtained with each method potentially
indicates the existence of a fuel leak.
Model based diagnostics provide a means of detecting subtle failures
within the SSME if sufficient observability exists for the condition being
monitored. However, their use appears too limited in scope to provide an
adequate damage minimization system. These models are best utilized to
address specific problems not adequately covered by a more
comprehensive failure detection scheme.
5.7 DATA TRENDING
Monitoring trends in the data enables early detection of anomalies. This
detection is based on estimates of where a value will be at some future
time. To evaluate the utility of this approach, a basic algorithm was
developed and simulations run.
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The data trending algorithm evaluated is a modification of the System for
Anomaly and Failure Detection (SAFD) algorithm. The fundamental
difference being in the decision signal; the average value of para0,_eters
for the SAFD versus the slope between consecutive averages Tur a
trending algorithm. Different averaging intervals for each parameter may
be required since some parameters have a relatively steady behavior while
others have more extreme excursions, even under normal operation. Thus,
it is prudent to determine the averaging interval based on the history of
excursions of the parameter values.
The slope-average algorithm is initialized with the slope-average
computed for the interval immediately following the establishmeni of
steady state (a number close to zero) as the "expected" value. A one sigma
"anomaly" band is defined and centered around the average value.
Another modification that may enhance the performance of the algorithm
is to update the expected slope (So) every several seconds if the
variations of the sl0pe-averages slice-to-slice are within a reasonable
limit, (otherwise slow trends would not be identifiable). This approach
has to be simulated further in order to assess the slice-to-slice variation
effects relative to normal and anomalous operating conditions.
Data from two SSME tests, during which engine degradations were the
reason for premature engine cutoff, were evaluated using the SAFD
algorithm and the slope-average approach and the results were compared
The results of applying the SAFD algorithm and the slope-average
approach to tests 901-364 and 901-225 are shown in Attachments 6 and
7, respectively. The slope-average profiles of Attachment 7 suggest that
this test could have been shutdown earlier, perhaps, at about 252 seconds,
as opposed to the SAFD algorithm cutoff time of 255.59 seconds.
Although, evaluation of more tests and failure simulations are needed to
assess the overall benefits of this approach, the simulation results
suggest that the data trending approach could complement SAFD. For
some parameters, the SAFD functions better than the slope-average
approach while for others, the latter might provide an earlier cutoff.
Thus, further analysis would be necessary to have a good understand!no of
the slope-average approach and to develop the failure detection logic. The
potential for use of this approach to transient conditions is also possible.
Data trending enhances the sensitivity of the failure detection process by
utilizing the slope of average signals rather than the averages themselves.
Thus, in many situations when signals have a tendency to change slowly
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due to "slow" failures, the slope average may be suitable to detection of
subtle changes in slope. Furthermore, when the slope-average continues
with the same sign (in the same direction)for several consecutive
calculations, this indicates a trend which (if sufficiently many signals
give the same indication) can be utilized for failure detection.
5.8 FLEETWlDE OPERATING ENVELOPES
Nominal value envelopes can be determined by utilizing the extensive
SSME hot-fire test database and associated data analysis experience.
Many of the nominal envelopes have already been developed and are
currently used to evaluate new hot-fire test data. These envelopes are
the basis of a proven technique for determining the reasonableness and
validity of measured hot-fire parameters. While other techniques such as
comparisons of two or more redundant measurements, exist for validating
measured parameters, the nominal envelope technique is especially useful
for validating non-redundant parameters.
Fleetwide envelopes are relatively large during steady state (due to
engine to engine variation) and do not provide sufficient resolution for
effective failure detection. However, they are well suited to identifying
anomalies during transients. Transient operation is observed to vary
between acceptable engines and even between nominal tests. The range of
values is due to minor effects within the engine that give a somewhat
statistical nature to the events (e.g. preburner and MCC ignitions during
the start transient). Therefore, transient anomalies are indicated by a
value significantly "out of range', rather than by deviations from a single
nominal value as in the case of most steady state anomaly detection
schemes.
Transient nominal envelopes are defined by formulating a time-dependent
envelope based on previous hot-fire experience. These envelopes are
composed point by point from nominal tests in the SSME hot-fire test
database. Maximum and minimum observed nominal values, over the
fleetwide data, are determined for each time slice during a transient. One
example of such an envelope is presented in Figure 5-17 for the HPOT
discharge temperature. This envelope is one currently used by Rocketdyne
for post-test analysis for SSME hot-fire tests. A more extensive set of
nominal envelopes for the start transient is included as Attachment 8.
In Figure 5-17, the maximum and minimum lines which make up the
envelope (based on 232 nominal tests) are indicated by solid lines. The
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dashed line represents the HPOT discharge temperature measured during
test 902-471.
The figure shows that the HPOT discharge temperature for this test
dropped below the minimum nominal level between about 1.8 and 2.7
seconds after engine start. In this case, the anomaly was indicative of a
slower than normal Oxidizer Pre-Burner (OPB) ignition. The SSME can, and
did, start successfully under these conditions, so this single anomaly
would not warrant shutting down the engine or a.ny other real-time
corrective action. After post test evaluation, an engineer might
recommend an increase in the OPB oxidizer valve open loop command for
the next test in order to allow more oxidizer into the OPB chamber during
start. Definition of significant anomalies during the start transient will
require careful evaluation by experienced SSME test operations and
performance analysis engineers.
However, failures during the start transient can be expected to show large
deviations from the nominal range as illustrated by the following test
case. On October 3, 1978 SSME #0006 experienced an anomaly during its
start transient. The test was terminated at +2.36 seconds by a low
chamber pressure confirmation redline and a HPFT discharge temperature
redline. Analysis of test data indicated that the HPFP speed buildup was
slow and the oxidizer dome primed early causing an abnormally LOX rich
condition during engine start. Figure 5-18 indicates this anomaly. The
shaded region indicates the nominal max/rain envelope determined from
237 tests. The solid line and small dashed line are the measured values
for two successful tests of engine #0006. The large dashed line indicates
the measured value for the test during which the failure occurred. In the
failure test, the HPFP speed is well out of the nominal range about 0.75
sec(_nds before the engine was cutoff. A more complete set of data plots
for this test series is provided as Attachment 9.
Two independent conditions were found that contributed to the LOX rich
atmosphere in the engine. The main oxidizer valve (MOV) had a
manufacturing problem. The MOV valve/actuator was mislocked open
resulting in the ball valve being open 3.5% more than normal, causing the
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early prime in the LOX dome (excessive oxidizer present at ignition). The
HPFP was late in breaking away due to binding of the third stage impeller
with the deteriorated repaired area in the high pressure orifice region of
the balance piston cavity and interstage seal rubbing.
Post-test inspection revealed damage to the HPFTP turbine and the hotgas
manifold liner (on the fuel preburner side) and the main injector (136
injector elements eroded between faceplates). Teardown inspection of
the engine disclosed the HPFTP turbine had sustained damage from burning
and erosion. A housing repair in the area of the high pressure balance
piston orifice had failed and heavy rubbing of the second stage interstage
seal had occurred.
Based on the anomalies observed, this test could have been confidently
cutoff earlier using the fleetwide nominal envelope approach to anomaly
detection.
5.9 POWER LEVEL DEPENDENT ALGORITHMS
The behaviors of a number of SSME performance parameters are highly
dependent on engine power level. Parameters included in this list are
turbine discharge temperatures, other turbopump inlet and discharge
temperatures and pressures, turbopump speeds, propellant flow rates, and
valve positions. Using relations between these parameters and engine
power level, algorithms based on power level can be derived for use in
calculating or predicting expected, measured parameter behaviors and in
inferring values for parameters which are not measured.
Various forms of these power level dependent algorithms are successfully
being utilized throughout Rocketdyne to perform off-line analysis as well
as real-time analysis of SSME data. Two algorithm forms of particular
interest are reasonableness curves and influence coefficients.
Reasonableness curves are empirically derived algorithms, based on a
third-order polynominal fit of SSME hot-fire test data as a function of
power level. They are currently included in the SSME Data Reduction Model
as a method of detecting sensor failures by performing a reasonableness
check of input data derived from sensor values. The reasonableness check
entails comparing measured parameters to calculated parameters using a
reasonableness band. While suited for their intended purpose,
reasonableness curves are relatively unsophisticated compared to
influence coefficients.
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Like reasonableness curves, influence coefficients generated by the SSME
Power Balance Model, can be used to estimate parameter magnitudes.
However, the accuracies of these parameter value estimates are greatly
improved by the ability of the influence influence coefficients to adjust
operating parameters for changes in engine performance caused by engine
inlet condition changes. The influence coefficients define "adjustments"
to the nominal power level dependent estimate to account for off-nominal
inlet conditions to a system or subsystem. Additionally, influence
coefficients have the capability of being tailored to a specific engine
when required. In this ype of application, they serve as both an engine-
specific and power-level-dependent calculation and prediction method.
The greater accuracy provided by the influence coefficient method allows
a tighter band to be considered when evaluating sensor data.
Figure 5-19 is a comparison of measured and predicted values of HPOTP
turbine discharge temperature during test 901-516 on engine number
2105. Presented in the figure are: 1) plots of the measured parameter
values, 2) parameter values predicted solely with a power level
dependent algorithm and 3) parameter values predicted with the same
power level dependent algorithm combined with adjustments for varying
inlet conditions. The inlet conditions adjusted for in this case were LOX
and fuel engine inlet pressures and temperatures. LOX and fuel tank
repressurization flow rates, and engine mixture ratio.
The figure indicates that the power level dependent algorithm predicted
the correct relative magnitude of the parameter, but the failure to
account for parameter variations due to changes in inlet conditions
greatly reduced the prediction accuracy. The prediction accuracy was
considerably increased by adjusting for inlet conditions. The inlet
condition adjustments act to reduce the deviation from the predicted
value and allow for tighter envelopes to be used for flagging abnormal
parameter values. It should be noted that the algorithms used to generate
Figure 5-19 were based on SSME fleet averages. Much more accurate
predictions could have been made by instead basing the algorithms on
earlier tests of engine 2105.
The advantages of utilizing influence coefficient analysis in a real-time
health management system include: 1) influence coefficients are a fast
and relatively accurate means of predicting operating parameter behavior,
and 2) they are relatively simple to develop, to tailor to specific
hardware, and to implement. The only significant disadvantage is that
influence coefficients provide a simplified estimate of the "nominal"
value and ._ome subtitles of engine operation may not be accounted for.
When combined with an appropriate operating envelope, influence
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coefficient based sensor data checking and anomaly identification provide
a very effective tool for real-time health management of rocket engines.
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5.10 VIBRATION MONITORING
Excessive vibration provides independent validation for failures indicated
by a performance anomaly and may provide the only early indication for
hard component failures in the turbopump. Excessive vibration is an early
indication for a number of failure modes, most notably bearing failures,
loss of turbopump balancing force, turbine blade fractures, and internal
rubbing. The failure modes highlighted in Table 5.8 are expected to
include abnormally high vibration levels as part of their failure signature.
In addition, of 19 SSME hot-fire failures with redline cutoffs, 4 were
cutoff by vibration redlines before the performance redlines were
exceeded (Table 5.9). Therefore, monitoring for excessive vibration can
be expected to significantly increase the confidence and detect_.bility of
turbopump failures.
Currently, vibration is monitored by both the redline and FASCOS systems
on the SSME. Both of these systems monitor relatively broadband
vibration spectra and operate as simple redline cutoffs. "Cross talk"
between components, an excitation caused by vibration of another
component, make fault isolation virtually impossible. While some utility
is gained by simply knowing the engine level vibration, validation of a
failure indicated by performance anomalies is enhanced by identification
of an isolated source of vibration.
A certain degree of fault isolation (at least to the level of isolating the
responsible turbopump) can be obtained by monitoring a narrow frequency
band centered around the synchronous frequency of each turbopump.
Justification for this approach lies in the fact that failures indicated by
vibration ultimately involve an imbalance in the pump rotating assembly,
resulting in a fundamental vibration at the pump synchronous frequency.
Real time, dynamic tracking filters (such as those developed by
Rocketdyne, under IR&D, for the bearing monitor program) have
demonstrated tracking and monitoring of pump synchronous frequencies
for real-time SSME data.
Nominal vibration levels can be defined through evaluation of the spectra
measured for SSME hot-fire tests. The ADDAM (Automated Digital Data
Analysis Machine) system is capable of performing the vibration analysis
necessary to characterize these spectra as illustrated by Figures 5-20
and 5-21. Figure 5-20 is the vibration power spectrum indicated by a
HPFP radial accelerometer for a specific
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TABLE 5.9 OBSERVED SSME REDLINE SHUTDOWNS
(1) SHUTDOWNREDLINE
HPFTDStemp
HPOTDStemp
PBPradaccel
HPOTP accel
HPFTP rad accel
HPFP speed
HPOTP secondary seal cavity pres
HEX DS pres
Elevation J minimum pres
NO. TESTS
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time slice. The HPFTP synchronous frequency (about 600 Hz) clearly has
the largest amplitude. Figure 5-21 shows the vibration pnwer spectrum
for the HPOP with time dependent information shown by using a time scale
along the Y-axis and overlaying the vibration data for each time slice.
Again the HPOTP synchronous vibration is clearly visible.
5.11 CONCLUSIONS
No single failure detection technique evaluated provides adequate
protection for the engine. However, many of the techniques have features
that would be expected to significantly improve the existing protection
system and a synthesis of applicable features provides the basis of the
HMSRE framework described in Section 6.
81
SECTION 6 - HMSRE FRAMEWORK
Key features of the failure detection methods evaluated in Section 5,
(those deemed to have the highest likelihood of success, in a near-term
application.) were combined to produce the HMSRE framework described in
this section. These features include the use of: parameter correlation,
operating envelopes, influence coefficients, power-level dependent
algorithms, vibration monitoring, and plume spectometry. The framework
is compatible with the SSME Block-II controller, is readily adaptable to
flight (most of the monitored parameters are existing Block-II
measurements), and can be implemented on a test stand within 5 years.
Additionally, it is anticipated that the HMSRE framework can be
implemented in the processing hardware currently under development for
SAFD on the SSME TTBE program.
Two general approaches were considered for the HMSRE framework. One
approach addressed a small set of failure modes resulting in fairly exact
identification of specific failures before issuing a cutoff command (e.g.
bearing signature analysis - Section 5.4). Sensitivity to and
identification of specific failure modes has the benefit of providing a high
degree of confidence that a failure is occurring, but lacks adequate failure
coverage in that only a handful of failure modes are detectable. The
alternate approach is to monitor for significant engine level anomalies.
This provides far greater failure coverage but does not identify which
specific failure mode is occurring.
Detailed failure or degradation information is necessary for an adaptive or
maintenance monitoring system, but a safety system needs only to
identify that a failure is occurring. In a safety system, detailed failure
information serves only to marginally increase confidence in the failure
detection. For example, if the HPFT discharge temperature suddenly
increases by 150 R and the shaft speed is 1000 rpm above normal,
something has probably failed within the engine. Additional monitoring to
determine the exact cause of the anomaly only delays the inevitable cutoff
command. Therefore, it was decided that monitoring for significant engine
anomalies better met the program goal of minimizing engine damage since
it provides earlier cutoff and greater coverage of failure modes, including
those never before observed and simultaneous, multiple failures. Failure
coverage is further increased by defining an HMSRE framework addressing
all phases of engine operation (except the cutoff transient). This includes
the start transient, mainstage steady state operation at all power levels,
and power transients. The cutoff transient is not addressed since an
HMSRE cutoff command during this phase would have no effect.
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Initially, a general strategy was defined for monitoring significant engine
anomalies. The strategy selected is based largely on the parameter
correlation schemes shown to have promise in Section 5.3. Combinations
of individual, weighted measurement deviations, correlated to provide
either an engine level anomaly value or indications of a specific
degradation such as a loss of HPFP efficiency, are used as engine failure
indicators. Engine anomaly thresholds are set for each parameter to
define significant anomaly limits. A key departure from the method
described in Section 5.3 is the definition of an overall engine anomaly
parameter. This parameter is not related to a known degradation, but
instead is intended to indicate general engine status and detect a wide
range of engine failures. Special classes of engine failures can be
detected earlier by monitoring losses in HPFTP efficiency, losses in
HPOTP efficiency, and losses in MCC combustion efficiency. Each of these
losses is indirectly observable using the correlations identified in Section
5.3 and are implemented as part of the framework.
This approach is in marked contrast to existing failure detection schemes
which rely on definition of anomalies for individual measurements. Since
the cutoff decision is based on an engine level parameter, rather than a
collection of individual anomalies, confidence that a failure has occurred
should be increased. For example, if increases are observed in a set of
related measurements (e.g. HPFTP turbine discharge temperature, speed,
FPOV position) the confidence that this represents an engine anomaly, and
not a collection of spurious sensor indications, is significantly higher
than if increases are observed for three "random" measurements.
Definition of engine level parameters also allows the HMSRE to detect a
wide variety of SSME early failure indications. For example, the first
indication of a failure may be a large deviation in only a few
measurements or it may be subtle changes in a relatively large number of
measurements. Since the HMSRE is not dependent on individual
measurement anomalies, a group of subtle changes is just as detectable as
a few major deviations, even if some of the measurements never deviate
enough to be considered "anomalous". This capability is especially
attractive for relatively slow failures in which many measurements
generally drift off nominal. Slow failures are of particular interest to
this program since early detection of these failures is expected to
significantly reduce the ensuing damage. Additionally, since the engine
anomaly parameters are determined from contributions of multiple
measurements, the system is especially tolerant of failed sensors. This
is a critical feature for any SSME failure detection scheme since failed
sensors are much more common than other types of engine failures.
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Other elements of the framework were defined to support the engine
anomaly detection strategy shown in Figure 6-1. Details of this
framework are described in three parts below: 1) data acquisition, 2)
correlation to engine failures, and 3) normalized measurement deviations.
The framework is easily expanded to include additional sensor inputs and
correlated parameters.
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6.1 DATA AQUISITION
The first step in defining the engine level anomaly strategy for the HMSRE
framework was selection of the individual measurements to be monitored
and identification of related engine and facility sensors.
A key issue involved in selection of individual measurements is the
number monitored. If too few measurements are monitored, the HMSRF
system could miss the earliest indications of some failures. If too many
measurements are monitored, the robustness and/or sensitivity of the
system will be degraded because of the random variations inherent in each
of the measurements. Values for correlated parameters would ideally be
0.0 for nominal test cases, but normal variations in individual
measurements result in a "background" level for the parameter. As more
measurements are monitored, this "background" level is increased.
Increasing the Wbackground" level has one of two effects: 1) if the engine
anomaly threshold is held constant, the probability of false indications is
increased (degraded robustness), or 2) if the threshold is increased t;
maintain robustness, larger measurement changes are required to indicate
an anomaly (degraded sensitivity). Therefore, individual measurements
were limited to those with the highest likelihood of early failure
indications.
Key selection criteria for the individual measurements were:
1) strong correlation to multiple engine failures
2) early failure indication
3) sensor availability
4) sensor redundancy
5) flight applicability
6) observability
Correlation of measurements to multiple engine failures is determined
through Rocketdynes SSME test operations experience and througl_
evaluation of the SSME failure history. A summary of the sensor
anomalies recorded for 21 SSME failures is shown in Figure 6-2. As an
example, Figure 6-2 indicates that the HPOT Discharge Temperature (seen
in 21 of 21 failures) is a better HMSRE candidate than the HPOT Primary
Seal Drain Temperature (seen in 2 of 21 failures).
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Earliness of failure indications was estimated by Rocketdynes SSME test
operations personnel and by evaluation of the SSME failures. Figure 6-3
indicates the time before redline cutoff that each sensor first indicated
an anoma;y. The data indicates that the turbine discharge temperatures,
for example, are among the earliest failure indicators for most of the
failures evaluated.
Sensor availability, redundancy, and flight applicability are addressed by
emphasizing existing SSME flight and facility measurements (Attachment
10). Additional measurements, such as the plume spectrometer, were
individually evaluated by Rocketdynes advanced instrumentation
personnel.
Observability of measurements is determined by SSME engine balance
model results (shown in Attachment 4), SSME system level evaluation, and
the SSME failure history. For example, the direct result of a fuel leak
should be a change in the MCC mixture ratio (and temperature) but the
SSME control system maintains mixture ratio constant, making this
indicator unobservable as shown by the SSME engine balance results for an
engine with a fuel leak.
Based on evaluation of these criteria, the following measurements were
selected for the HMSRE framework:
1. HPFT Discharge Temperature
2. HPOT Discharge Temperature
3. HPFT Delta Pres_;ure
4. HPOT Delta Pressure
5. MCC Pressure
6. HPFP Speed
7. HPOP Speed
8. FPOV Position
9. OPOV Position
10. HPFTP Vibration
11. HPOTP Vibration
12. Plume Contamination
The measurements selected are mainly existing SSME block-II controller
measurements, thereby ensuring that the HMSRE is suitable for flight
application. Three measurements that are expected to enhance the overall
performance of the HMSRE are not included in the block-II data set: the
oxidizer preburner pressure (measured by the facility), the HPOP speed
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(obtained from the synchronous vibration indicated by
accelerometers), and _ume contaminants (new measurement).
HPOTP
The majority of selected measurements are turbopu,np measurements.
This was a natural consequence of the selection process (which heavily
weighted proven observability) since other failure indications tend to be
obscured by the SSME closed loop control system: Therefore, the
observable failure indications are those that reflect the control system
response to a degraded engine, forcing one or both turbopumps to operate
at off nominal values. An exception to this rule is the MCC Pressure,
whose value is actively controlled by the SSME block-ll controller.
Observed changes in this parameter would indicate serious problems with
the engine or a loss of control functionality.
The HMSRE measurement set is completed by the inclusion of several
parameters known to indicate failures that might not effect the
performance parameters. Turbopump vibration (in a narrow band centered
around the pump synchronous frequencies) is included based on the utility
of these measurements shown in Section 5.10. Plume munitoring has less
of a historical basis but has the potential for earlier indications of
several failure modes (Section 5.5.1) including combustion device failures
which provide little or no early warning in SSME performance
measurements.
Figure 6-4 shows the source of data for each of the individual
measurements and summarizes the data acquisition part of the
framework. Table 6.1 indicates the available redundancy for each of the
measurements selected.
6.2 CORRELATION TO ENGINE FAILURES
Individual measurements are correlated to engine failures through the
definition of engine anomaly parameters as described earlier. Since only
the differences in these parameters are used to indicate failures, the
deviations of individual measurements, rather than their absolute values,
are used to estimate changes in the correlated parameters. The individual
measurements are normalized to reflect confidence in the measured
deviations.
The method for correlating individual measurements to engine parameters
is shown in Figure 6-5. Each normalized measurement is weighted. The
sum of the weighted measurements provides estimates of engine anomaly
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TABLE 6.1 HMSRE BASELINE MEASUREMENTS
Measurement
= ii
HPFT DS Tmp
HPOT DS Tmp
HPFT dP
FPB Pc
MCC HG Inlet Pr
HPOT dP
OPB Pc
MCC HG Inlet Pr
MCC Pc
HPFP Speed
HPOP Speed
HPOP Rad. Accel.
FPOV Position
OPOV Position
HPFTP Vibration
HPOTP Vibration
Plume Contaminants
Calc.
X
X
X
BIk- II
i
2R
2R
S
S
Qw
S
2R
S(2)
3R*
S(2)
S(2)
3R
3R
CADS
S
S
Facil.
2R
2R
S s
S S
-" S
S S
2R --
S(2) s
3R* 7R(a)
3R 9R(a)
39 10R(a),
New
S
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Sensor Anomaly #1, $1
Sensor Anomaly #2, $2
Sensor Anomaly #M, SM
Engine
Anomaly
#1
Wll
W21
Win2
Engine
Anomaly
#2
W12
Engine
Anomaly
#n
Wl n
_'-C/onditional data fitter (eg, only include posilive values of W_i • Si ; limit Value of Wit - S i )'7/
,'/!/////////l/ll/l/tJ/lfl/////////'//////
Engine m
Anomaly E i T Wil "Si
Value, Ei i= 1
FIGURE 6-5 ENGINE ANOMALY CORRELATION STRATEGY
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parameters. A cutoff threshold, above the noise level observed for
nominal tests, is set for each parameter. The engine would be sent a
cutoff command if any of these thresholds is exceeded. Each measurement
is normalized to indicate the number of confidence limits (a limit related
to the confidence in the measured deviation - Section 6.3) the measured
value deviates from an estimated nominal value. Correlated parameters
are defined to be the weighted sum of some or all of these normalized
measurements.
The basic failure indicator is a general anomaly parameter defined to
indicate overall engine status. The baseline correlation for this
parameter is a simple sum of all normalized measurements. This
parameter is sensitive to any failures causing deviations in one or more
HMSRE measurements. For example, if all the weighting factors are set to
1.0, a correlated value of 5 would indicate that: 1) one sensor is off
nominal by 5 times the confidence limit set for that parameter, 2) five
sensors are each off nominal by 1 times the confidence limit, or 3) some
other combination of sensor values are resulting in a combined off
nominal value of 5. In other words, the correlation strategy indicates a
level of confidence that an engine failure is occurring. The confidence can
be increased by a few individual indicators reading far from nominal, or by
many indicators simultaneously drifting off nominal by a lesser amount.
This parameter is expected to detect most SSME failures and evaluation of
the SSME failure history indicates that 18 of 22 past failures would have
been detected by this parameter.
Three additional correlation parameters, especially sensitive to the
classes of failures indicated, are included in the baseline HMSRE
framework: Loss of HPOTP efficiency, Loss of HPFTP efficiency, and Loss
of MCC combustion efficiency. These parameters have a lower noise level
than the general anomaly parameter since only specific measurement
deviations are included in the weighted sum. This enables a lower
threshold and corresponding earlier cutoff.
A preliminary set of weighting factors for these special cases can be
determined using the SSME engine balance model. The model was run for
each special case. The results are included as Attachment 4 and are
summarized in Table 6-2. Table 6-2 indicates the direction and percent
change observed for each of the HMSRE parameters. As an example, the
Loss of HPFTP Efficiency set of weighting factors are qualitatively shown
in Figure 6-6. MCC Pc, OPOV position, and HPOP speed have weighting
factors of 0 since very little relative change is expected for these
parameters. The aqomalies observed for three SSME failures that resulted
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TABLE 6.2 NORMALIZED DEVIATIONS FOR FAILURE CORRELATIONS
Engine
Parameters
HPFT DS T
HPOT DS T
HPFT Delta P
HPOT Delta p
HPFP-N
HPOP-N
FPOV
OPOV
MCC Pc
Loss of
Combustion
Efficiency
Loss of
HPOP
Efficiency
-0.20
+1,00
+0.10
+0.65
+0.10
+0.60
-0.50
+0.30
0.00
=0.18
+0.91
+0.09
+0.59
+0.09
+0.00
+0.09
+1.00
0.00
Loss of
HPFP
Efficiency
+0.79
-0.53
+0.68
+0.21
+0.21
-0.00
+1.00
-.05
0.00
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in a loss of HPFTP efficiency are also shown and correlate well with the
expected parameter indications.
6.3 NORMALIZED MEASUREMENT DEVIATIONS
The approach used to normalize individual measurement deviations is
shown by Figure 6-7. For each measurement, an expected nominal value is
defined. The difference between the actual measurement and the nominal
value indicates the magnitude and direction of measured deviations. The
normalized value is defined by dividing the difference between measurccl
and nominal values by the associated confidence limit.
Using the approach outlined above, normalizing measureme.nt deviatioqs
is reduced to a two part problem: 1) definition of a nominal value, and 2)
definition of a confidence level.
Based on the evaluation of detection techniques, three approaches w_re
selected to estimate the nominal value of each measurement: 1) fleetwide
operating envelopes, 2) steady state initial values, and 3) power
dependent values. Each technique is applicable to a different part of the
SSME operating profile and regions of applicability are shown in Figure 6-
8. During transients and the initial seconds of the first steady state,
fleetwide operational envelopes provide the most useful estimate of
nominal measurements (Section 5.8). The first few seconds of
subsequent steady states are more accurately estimated by predicting the
value based on the values measured during the initial steady state and the
scheduled power change (Section 5.9). During the first few seconds of
steady state operation, an average is taken and serves as an accurate
estimate for the remainder of steady state (Section 5.2). Details about
each of these estimation techniques can be found in the referenced
sections.
The second requirement is definition of confidence limits. The confidence
limit can be thought of as the limit beyond which an engine expert would
say that a particular measurement is indicating an anomaly. Therefore,
a normalized value of 1.5 would correspond to a high degree of confidence
that a measured deviation is significant. On the other hand, a value of 0.5
would indicate only that the measured deviation could be an indication
that an engine level parameter is changing.. The confidence limits are
different for each parameter and are expected to change during transients.
However, the confidence limits are defined such that the numerical values
of the anomaly indications are always consistent (i.e. value=l.0 indicates
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that a deviation is significant). Quantification of the confidence limits
will require a thorough sensitivity study based on SSME test histories and
models.
6.4 FRAMEWORK CONCLUSIONS
The framework described in this section is composed of well established
failure detection elements, applicable to SSME failures, and compatible
with implementation in SAFD hardware currently under development (see
Attachment 11). This represents a low risk, high payoff strategy for near
term implementation.
The framework represents a system that is compatible with the BIock-II
controller and is easily extended to flight applications. It is sensitive to
a wide variety of failure indications, provides early indications of engine
failures, is tolerant to sensor failures, and allows a high degree of
confidence in engine cutoff commands.
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7.0 - EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION
A measure of the HMSRE effectiveness is obtained by comparing key
framework characteristics with those of a baseline detection system, in
this case the SAFD system. The effectiveness of the HMSRE framework is
evaluated based on four criteria important to rocket engine failure
detection systems: I) Failure Coverage, 2) Engine Phase Coverage, 3)
Earliness of Indication, and 4) Degradation Due to Sensor Failures. A
summary of the effectiveness evaluation is shown in Table 7.1.
Failure Coverage
The failure coverage of the HMSRE was characterized by two different
methods: evaluation of 28 SSME incident tests and determination of
detectable failure modes.
Twenty eight SSME incident tests were identified and summarized in the
SAFD phase II report. The tests covered a wide variety of engine failures
and are assumed to be representative of SSME failure indications. These
tests were used to estimate the failure coverage of both the SAFD system
and the HMSRE framework. For each of the tests listed in Table 7.2, The
maximum number of sensors indicating an anomaly was determined to
characterize the SAFD system and the maximum value of the HMSRE basic
algorithm was calculated to characterize the HMSRE framework.
Of the 28 tests, 4 lasted the program duration and resulted in only minor
damage to the engine. These tests are assumed to be near (but slightly
below) the threshold of damage sufficient to warrant engine shutdown.
Therefore, of the 28 incident tests, 24 required cutoff and 4 did not.
To estimate the cutoff criteria for the HMSRE framework, the incident
test data was graphically represented in Figure 7-1. For each test, the
maximum HMSRE basic algorithm value is plotted along the Y-direction.
The four program duration, minor damage tests (assumed not to warrant
engine cutoff) are represented by empty boxes. Based on these data, a
HMSRE cutoff threshold of 6.0 was selected for evaluation purposes.
Using a threshold of 6.0, 19 (of 24) tests would have been cutoff early - a
demonstrated failure coverage of 79%. Equally important, none of the
program duration, minor damage tests would have been cutoff. The failure
coverage demonstrated for the HMSRE is comparable to that expected with
SAFD (18 of 24 tests cutoff).
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TABLE 7.1 HMSRE EFFECTIVENESS SUMMARY
SAFD HMSRE
:ailure Coverage (based on 28 incident tests)
Number of tests correctly c/o early:
Number of tests erroneously c/o early:
18/24 1 9/24
(75%) (79%)
0/4 0/4
"allure Coverage (based on ranked failure modes) n/a 55%
-ngine Phase Coverage
Start Transient
Steady State
Power Transient
Cutoff Transient
no yes
yes yes
no yes
no no
-arliness of Indication (time before Redline c/o)
Test 901-307
Test 902-198
Test 902-249
20.0 31.5
3.1 3.4
61 121
Degradation due to sensor failure slight slight
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TABLE 7.2 SSME TEST HISTORY SUMMARY
TEST MAXIMUM SAFD MAXIMUM HMSRE MINOR PROGRAM
NUMBER ANOMALIES MAGNITUDE (est *) DAMAGE DURATION
SF6-01 5 56.2
SF10-01 5 14.0
750-1 48 1 2 69.1
750-175 8 133.4
750-259 1 2 103.9
901-11 0 1 2.2
901-136 2 4.9
901 -1 73 1 1 25.0
901 - 1 83 2 2.2 •
901 -225 8 46.4
901 -284 6 126.2
901 -307 7 9.6
901-331 1 3 66.8
901 -340 9 22.2
901-346 6 11.1
901 -362 1 5.1 °
901 -363 2 5.2 °
901 -364 7 18.3
901-410 3 9.8
901 -436 8 52.1
901 -485 2 4.6 •
902-095 0 0.0
902-112 7 60.6
902-118 8 24.9
902-120 1 2.6
902-198 1 2 82.4
902-209 1 2.9
902-249 6 27.4
* estimated using SAFD sigma values and all sensor weights = 1.0
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KEY: • redlip,_ c/o, major damage
• program duration, major damage
O redline c/o, minor damage
[] program duration, minor damage
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The false alarm rate is expected to be low since the cutoff is 3 times the
nominal value and even tests indicating some minor damage remain below
the threshold.
Evaluation of the incident tests indicate good failure coverage and a high
degree of failure detection robustness.
The second method used to estimate the failure coverage was to identify
failure modes among the 45 most likely to occur (according to the Task 1
ranking) detectable by the HMSRE framework. Detectability was assumed
for failure modes expected to affect at least two different HMSRE
measurements (i.e. HPOT discharge temperature A & B count as 1
measurement). The percentage of failure modes detectable with the HMSRE
was estimated by using the figure of merit values as rough estimates for
the relative likelihood of each failure mode occurring. This approach
indicates that about 55% of all criticality 1 engine failures should be
detectable. The assumptions and approximations used in the above failure
coverage assessment reflect the tendency towards detectability for each
failure mode.
Enaine Phase Coveraae
The HMSRE framework addresses all phases of engine operations (start
transient, mainstage steady state, power transients) except the cutoff
phase.
Earliness of Indication
The earliness of failure indication is approximated by evaluating three
specific test cases: 901-307, 902-198, and 902-249. The results of these
evaluations are shown in Figures 7-2, 7-3, and 7-4. A comparison of
cutoff times is shown in Figure 7-5. The HMSRE could have provided an
earlier cutoff, as compared to SAFD or Redlines, in all cases.
For test 902-198, the small amount of time gained by using the HMSRE
(0.3 sec) probably would not significantly reduce the engine damage as
compared to SAFD cutoff.
Test 901-307 shows the HMSRE cutoff 11.5 seconds before the SAFD
cutoff. It is likely that significant engine damage occurred during this
time interval.
105
Test 902-249 shows the HMSRE cutoff at t=330 and the SAFD cutoff at
t-390 Examination of the test summary indicatA._ that the engine was
slowly degrading until a rub ring failed at t=374. Following failure of this
ring, the engine degradation accelerated and spread to other components.
Therefore, significant engine damage clearly could have been avoided if
the engine were cutoff at the HMSRE threshold.
Dearadation.Due to Sensor Failure
Insensitivity to sensor failures is crucial to a rocket engine failure
detection system. Sensors fail at a much higher rate than any other engine
component and a detection system dependent on any single sensor is likely
to find itself "blind" when that sensor fails. The HMSRE estimates
anomalies and degraded conditions based on the influences of 14
individual measurements. Therefore, the loss of any sensor (or several
sensors) slightly degrades the overall failure if=dication but does not
preclude detection.
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SECTION 8 BREADBOARD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
A 24 month program is recommended for the implementation of a
breadboard version of the HMSRE. This will providean HMSRE ready for
use in conjunction with a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) when it is
being "hot-fired" on a test stand. It is expected that the HMSRE will
provide additional protection to the engine during test firing thereby
providing a higher probability of engine and/or major component survival.
This plan provides an overview of how to accomplish the required work. It
includes a program logic diagram, a program WBS chart, a program time
schedule, a program manloading figure and an implementation plan
narrative. This narrative includes estimated manloading, required test
facilities, overall plans for testing and a technology program to fill near
term technology voids.
8.1 PROGRAM LOGIC
The technical logic flow for the program (Figure 8-1) describes the task
sequence and interrelationships for the planned work. Information flow
and review points are indicated. This provides a pictorial description of
the flow of work that complements the more structured WBS and schedule
charts,
Rocketdyne plans to base the HMSRE breadboard implementation in
software development and validation efforts, ultimately for
implementation on the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Technology Test
Bed (TTBE). The breadboard implementation of the HMSRE will be on
computer/workstation hardware which is available at Rocketdyne. The
program is divided into three sequential software development and test
related tasks, and a parallel technology task.
In Task 1 (Preliminary System Definition), preliminary algorithms for
correlating failure data from multiple sensor streams are developed.
Nominal value estimation techniques will be defined, and a preliminary
database of engine test information which will be used for HMSRE testing
will be established. Preliminary confidence limits and weightinq factors
will be established, and the preliminary algorithms will be coded, with a
preliminary system testing period which overlaps the algorithm coding
effort to ensure that the HMSRE works successfully in a preliminary state
prior to the system development task. The output of this task will be a
set of runs (approximately 12) which indicate the length of time before
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redline cutoff which the HMSRE would signal for engine shutdown.
rp,sults will be presented at LeRC as part of the Task 1 review.
These
System Development (Task 2), will produce a comprehensive HMSRE, with
a full complement of engine test data for HMSRE testing and a full set of
algorithms. This task starts with algorithm and full engine test database
development. Confidence limits and weighting factors will be defined and
implemented in the HMSRE algorithms. Inlet condition correlation
techniques will be established and then the algorithms will be coded. The
HMSRE will be tested and a sensitivity study will be conducted in parallel
with this testing. The hardware for Task 2 activities will be a
computer/workstation at the Rocketdyne Canoga Park facility. The
system development efforts are expected to incorporate coding techniques
which will facilitate code debugging and prove HMSRE functionality. A
Task 2 review will be held at LeRC at the conclusion of Task 2.
Task 3, System Refinement and Validation will focus on adding fidelity to
",he HMSRE through the refinement of the nominal value estimator,
confidence limits and weighting factors. Additionally the HMSRE code
will be "stripped" of software development "hooks" and messages, to
increase speed. At this stage, the HMSRE can be installed on the SAFD
development hardware at Rocketdyne's Canoga facility. By this means, any
bugs in the system can be worked out on hardware which is configured to
behave like the TTBE implementation hardware. Validation testing will be
conducted at Rocketdyne and utilize the full engine test database.
Successful SSME test data will be used to test for. erroneous cutoff.
Anomalous test data will be used to "trigger" the HMSRE, and engine
simulations will be used to test HMSRE on failure modes that have not
occurred or have not been recorded. The HMSRE can then be installed on
the SAFD hardware at the TTBE facility. Here it is planned to first
implement the HMSRE as a warning device to the test operator where a
noise and/or visual indication would be used to quickly signal pending
mishaps. Subsequently the HMSRE will be wired to the engine shutdown
interface to initiate TTBE shutdown as required.
Three technology voids (elements expected to enhance the overall HMSRE
effnctiveness but not currently available for the SSME) will be addressed
in Task 4. None of these efforts represent major challenges, and
development should be low risk. The areas addressed are plume
spectrometry failure correlation, Turbopump narrow-band vibration
failure correlation, and oxidizer turbopump vibration to speed
calculations.
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8.1.1 Work Breakdown Structure
The program WBS chart ( Figure 8-2) defines work elements to the third
level. For the technical tasks (Tasks 1 through 4), subtasks are described.
The WBS provides a structured means for allocating program resources,
closely monitoring the performance of technical work, and controlling the
program expenditures.
8.1.2 Program Schedule
The program schedule is shown in Figure 8-3. Time phasing of the
elements to the third (subtask) level, and subtask completion dates are
shown. Task timeline allocations are made based on task activities
within the 24 month period. The Task 1, (Preliminary System Definition)
technical effort will be performed in the first six months and Task 2
(System Development) will start in the seventh month and continue for
fourteen months. Task 3 (System Refinement and Validation)will be
initiated at the beginning of the twenty-first month with a duration of
four months. Task 4 (Technology Voids) will start in the seventh month
and continue through the thirteenth month.
Figure 8-4 summarizes the Rocketdyne program manpower loading for the
technical effort, and is the basis for cost estimating.
8.2 ESTIMATED MANLOADING
The estimated HMSRE implementation cost is based on a preliminary work
breakdown structure (WBS), combined with a preliminary schedule. Hours
and durations for each WBS element have been estimated by a team
consisting of the current principal investigator, the project manager and
functional managers presiding over supporting personnel. The estimate is
based on experience on similar programs/ tasks and takes advantage of
applicable past and parallel efforts.
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8.3 TEST FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
Computation Requirements
It has been determined that a commercial/industrial grade computer will
have enough capacity and speed to perform the necessary calculations and
input/output in the requisite time to provide enhanced engine protection
during test firing.
The best suited available test facility for the HMSRE development is a
workstation at Rocketdyne-Canoga. This allows ready access to the
extensive SSME test data history. Our digital data room can format the
test data into ASCII files which can be installed on and accessed from the
development station hard disc drive. This will accommodate the HMSRE
implementation system development goals. The development station will
be self-contained in that it will not seek data from outside the
workstation during test runs. The test data to support these runs will
come from the engine test database and from Rocketdyne's SSME model
outputs. When the HMSRE has been streamlined for real time operation and
validated at Rocketdyne in the local SAFD system, the TTBE facility will
come into play. The HMSRE real time code will be transferred to the SAFD
hardware at TTBE. This supports the ultimate HMSRE implementation
goals by providing hot-fire engine test data and potential interaction
with the engine via the SSME controller (SSMEC). Test data will come
from both the engine instrumentation and facility instrumentation. The
use of the System for Anomaly and Failure Detection (SAFD) on the SSME
TTBE is integral to HMSRE TTBE implementation. It is planned to use the
SAFD capabilities for HMSRE signal conditioning, multiplexing and
computing as well as the SAFD algorithms.
The following models are among those available for use in this program:
The SSME DTM Model. A thermodynamic, transient, engine system and
component performance prediction model. The SSME DTM is used for
engine system design analysis and engine anomaly simulations. The SSME
DTM is normally run in batch mode on Rockwell's Cyber 875 computer
located at the Information Systems Center in Seal Beach, CA.
The SSME FLYTE Model. A linear, steady-state, engine system and
component performance prediction model incorporating influence
coefficients. The SSME FLYTE is used for STS flight performance
prediction, reconstruction, and anomaly resolution analyses and is
normally run in a batch mode on Rocketdyne's ATDM computer.
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The SSME OTPP Model. A thermodynamic, steady-state oxidizer turbopump
component test data reduction model. The SSME OTPP is normally run
interactively on SSME Oxidizer Turbomachinery IBM microcomputers
located at the Canoga Facility.
The SSME HPOTP model. A thermodynamic, steady-state oxidizer
turbopump component performance prediction model. The SSME HPOTP is
used for SSME HPOTP detailed design analysis and performance prediction
and is normally run interactively on SSME Hydrodynamics' Apollo
workstations located at the Canoga Facility.
A summary of the models is given in Table 8-1. Several of the models
accommodate the nonlinear aspects of the system and each is written in
the programming language FORTRAN 77. The DRP, FLYTE, OTPP, and HPOTP
models perform analysis and anomaly resolution of SSME hot fire data.
8.4 ACQUISITION PLANS
Since it is planned to utilize Rocketdyne-supplied computing hardware for
development and initial breadboard HMSRE implementation; and the SAFD
hardware at Rocketdyne _nd MSFC-TTBE for ultimate validation, no
acquisition plans are anticipated.
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TABLE 8.1 ANALYTICAL MODELS
ModelN=ne
SSME Power Balance Model
LEM: Unear Engine Model
FLYTE
FREDA
DRP
DTM
OTPP
HPOTP
Hydrodynamic Models
Seal Models
Aero-Thermal Models
Miscellaneous Models
| I II
ModelFumtion
Non-Linear thermodynamic performance
prediction and power balance model (PBM)
Linearization of PBM.
SSME intluence coefficient model
calculates general trends.
SSME linear flight data prediction and
reconstruction model.
Inferred flow parameter calculations.
Test data driven.
Non-linear, thermodynamic, steady-state
performance prediction.
Non-linear, thermodynamic, transient
performance prediction.
Steady-state, component test data
reduction.
Steady-state, oxidizer turbopump
performance preduction.
Inferred parameter calculations.
Test data driven.
Back-calculation of engine parameters.
Thermally affected parameters.
Component expansion characteristics.
Expected operation conditions from
equilibriumcalculations.
Smaller models used for the analysis and/or
design of specific components, configurations
or scenarios.
HMSRE Models
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8.5 TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
Throughout the program, emphasis was placed on compatability with the
SSME block-I! controller and available facility measurements.
Measurements requiring additional development, either in hardware or
processing, were not included unless they were felt to offer significant
enhancement to the HMSRE. On this basis, only three technology closure
areas are conceived for application to the HMSRE. These are the
characterization of plume spectrometry for failure mode recognition, the
determination of nominal high pressure turbopump vibration values and
their correlation to failure modes, and the calculation of high pressure
oxidizer turbopump speed from real-time HPOTP vibration data.
8.5.1 Plume Spectrometry
Plume spectrometry provides information, related to internal hardware
degradation, that is unavailable with the existing SSME instrumentation.
The development effort for this technology consists of two parts: 1)
definition of failure related plume anomalies, and 2) plume spectrometry
system development.
DEFINITION OF FAILURE RELATED PLUME ANOMALIES
Task 1 - Define critical plume anomaly measurements. Definition of
critical measurements includes the selection of monitored materials,
identification of anomaly type (e.g. steady plume contamination, spurious
plume contamination, increasing plume contamination), and identification
of anomaly location (e.g. distributed throughout plume, streaks). Since no
significant failure database is available, definition of plume
contamination anomalies will rely on expert opinion, detailed modellin0,
and probabilistic representation of degration modes and engine dynamics.
The general approach:
• Select critical/representative failure modes
• Define general failure scenarios
• Characterize degradations (e.g. continous erosion, large chunks of
material released)
• Characterize plume contaminations (e.g. Inconel 718, continousfy
present in plume, steady increase in contamination level, fine
particles, evenly distributed throughout plume)
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Task 2 Define nominal values. Nominal SSME operating values will be
established for the plume anomaly indications defined in Task 1. Nominal
values are defined by evaluating existing Rocketdyne SSME hot-fire data
and the data from the Stennis Space Center plume spectrometry hot-fire
testing program for each anomaly.
Task 3 - Define acceptable limits. Acceptable deviation limits, for each
nominal value defined in task 2, will be established. These limits are
based on the statistical distribution of observed values in nominal tests,
the expertise of appropriate design and test personnel, and plume
contamination calibration tests.
PLUME SPECTROMETRY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Task 1 - System definition. Trade studies will be performed, based on the
anomaly definition results described above, to identify required system
features. These evaluations are expected to include plume coverage (wide
angle, line, single point, etc.), temporal resolution, monitored chemical
species, monitoring capabilities (full spectrum, discrete bandwidths), and
material quantification requirements.
Task 2 System development. Hardware and data processing software
will be developed to implement capabilities defined in task 1 that are not
available with current plume monitoring systems.
Task 3 - System calibration and sensitivity evaluation. The system
response to known plume contamination concentrations will be evaluated
to correlate the measured plume anomalies to engine hardware
degradations defined above.
8.5.2 High Pressure Turbopump Vibration to
Correlation
Failure Mode
Hardware degradation of the high pressure turbopumps is often
accompanied by increased vibration levels. Sensitive vibration monitoring
is expected to provide indications of rotating assembly degradations (e.g.
bearings, seals) before the degradation becomes severe enough to
significantly influence the performance parameters monitored by the
block-I! controller. Current vibration measurements monitor a fairly wide
vibration band and redlines are based on the overall RMS vibration levels.
For the HMSRE, isolation of the vibration source to a specific component is
desirable to enable effective correlation with other HMSRE parameters
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that indicate a failure. The accelerometers are available and are
currently used by the block-II controller. Therefore, the development
required ,or the HMSRE is limited to the hardware/software necessary to
isolate specific component vibration signals and the quantification of the
HMSRE nominal values and limits.
Task 1 Development of vibration isolation hardware and software. Real-
time hardware and software will be developed to isolate vibration signals.
Several approaches will be evaluated, including tracking filters and
software caoable of identifying vibration "peaks" indicative of a specific
component. The isolation system will be tested and evaluated using SSME
taped vibration data.
Task 2 - Quantification of nominal values. Nominal values are established
by evaluating the recorded vibration levels, in the bands monitored by the
system developed in task 1, for a range of nominal SSME hot-fire tests.
Average values will be established at each power level. In addition, the
influence of changing inlet conditions will be assessed through evaluation
of appropr!ate test data.
Task 3 Quantification of limits. Limits will be established, for each
band in t_,e system defined in task 1, based on the statistical fluctuations
in the data evaluated during task 2 and evaluation of SSME failure tests.
8.5.3 High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump Vibration to Speed
Correlation
The HPOTP speed provides a good indication of HPOTP performance and
how hard the pump is being worked. No speed sensor currently exists on
the HPOTP, but the speed is calculated (post-test) based on the frequency
of the pump sysnchronous frequency. The development effort required for
this measurement is to implement the frequency-speed relationship in a
real-time system.
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SECTION 9 - SUMMARY
The SSME test history ;ndicates that specific early indications of
catastrophic engine failur_ vary widely, even for similar failures. This
observation, coupled with the fact that the probability of any one specific
failure and propagation scenario is quite small (estimated at about 1% for
the most likely failure mode) suggests that an algorithm sensitive to a
wide variety of general failure indications is the most appropriate for
near term applications. Therefore, the guiding principle behind the HMSRE
algorithm is to provide capabilities for early detection of generic SSME
failure indications, rather than addressing specific failure modes
individually.
Evaluation of the most likely SSME FMEA failure modes, determined by the
figure of merit approach, and evaluation of the SSME failure history
indicate that several existing measurements generally provide
significant, early indications of immenent catastrophic engine failures.
These measurements are primarily related to high pressure turbopump
performance, but also include vibration and the main injector pressure.
Nine classes of detection schemes were evaluated for extracting early
failure indications from the key engine operating parameters identified as
generic SSME failure indicators. Of these nine classes, features from five
were selected for the HMSRE algorithm: Advanced Redlines, Parameter
Correlation, Operational Envelopes, Power Level Dependent Algorithms,
and Vibration Monitoring.
The HMSRE failure detection strategy evaluates the difference between
measured critical operating conditions and predicted nominal values. The
likelihood of catastrophic engine failure is approximated by a weighted,
correlated sum of these differences. This strategy enables sensitivity to
a wide variety of early failure indications ranging from large excursions
in a single, validated parameter to the gradual drifting of a large number
of correlated parameters.
Evaluation of the SSME test history indicates that the HMSRE algorithm
would have detected 79% of the major incidents. Furthermore, the
algorithm provided indications of imminent catastrophic failure well in
advance of redline cutoffs for each of three SSME failures representing
three distinct failure types.
In addition, the HMSRE algorithm is easily extended to include additional
measurements, both conventional and advanced, Pnd the correlation
124
strategy can be refined to include expert system analysis or even neural
network type processing.
Finally, in conclusion: the use of available SSME measurements, the
generic failure detection utility of the algorithm, the wide failure
coverage, the demonstrated early failure indications for three SSME test
cases, and the extensibility of the algorithm combine to provide a low
risk, high payoff approach for significant improvements in near term SSME
failure detection capabilities.
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ATTACHMENT 1
OVERALL FAILURE MODE RANKING
KEY TO ATTACHMENT 1
Column A - Overall Failure Mode Ranking
Column C - SSME FMEA Failure Mode Designation
Field 1 (1 digit) Component Type, example: B200-15
A = COMBUSTION DEVICES
B - TURBOMACHINERY
C - PNEUMATICS
D = PROPELLANT VALVES
E -- ACTUATORS
F = CONTROLLER/FASCOS
G = IGNITERS
H = ELECTRICAL HARNESSES
J = SENSORS/INSTRUMENTATION
K = LINES AND DUCTS
L = JOINTS
M = GIMBAL
N = ORIFICES
Field 2 (3 digits) Specific Component Designation, example: B200-1 5
Field 3 (2 digits) Failure Mode Designation, example: B200-15
Column E - Specific Component (corresponds to field 2 of column C)
Column F - Failure Mode (corresponds to field 3 of column C)
Column BY - Figure of Merit Rating (0-1)
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ATTACHMENT 2
FAILURE MODE RANKING BY LRU
KEY TO ATTACHMENT 2
Column A - Overall Failure Mode Ranking
Column C - SSME FMEA Failure Mode Designation
Field 1 (1 digit) Component Type, example: B200-15
A = COMBUSTION DEVICES
B = TURBOMACHINERY
C = PNEUMATICS
D = PROPELLANT VALVES
E = ACTUATORS
F = CONTROLLER/FASCOS
G = IGNITERS
H = ELECTRICAL HARNESSES
J = SENSORS/INSTRUMENTATION
K = LINES AND DUCTS
L = JOINTS
M = GIMBAL
N = ORIFICES
Field 2 (3 digits) Specific Component Designation, example: B200-15
Field 3 (2 digits) Failure Mode Designation, example: B200-15
Column E - Specific Component (corresponds to field 2 of column C)
Column F - Failure Mode (corresponds to field 3 of column C)
Column BY - Figure of Merit Rating (0-1)
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ATTACHMENT 3
FAILURE MODE SUMMARIES
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AFV
ASI
co¢
CCVA
F
FBV
FPB
FPL
FPOV
CCV
HEX
HF
HGM
HPFTP
HPOTP
HPV
LPFTP
LPOTP
LRU
LVDT
MCC
MFV
MOV
MPL
MR
MVA
OBV
OPB
OPOV
fX
PB
PBP
PBVA
PCA
RIV
RPL
RVDT
SRB
TB
VEEI
Anti-Flood Valve
Augmented Spark Igniter
Chamber Coolant Valve
Chamber Coolant Valve Actuator
Flight
Fuel Bleed Valve
Fuel Preburner
Full Power Level
Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve
Gaseous Oxygen Control Valve
Heat Exchanger
High Frequency
Hot Gas Manifold
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Helium Precharge Valve
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Line Replaceable Unit
Linear Variable Differential Transformer
Main Combustion Chamber
Main Fuel Valve
Main Oxidizer Valve
Minimum Power Level
Mixture Ratio
Main Valve Actuator
Oxidizer Bleed Valve
Oxidizer Preburner
Oxidizer Preburncr Oxidizer Valve
Oxidizer
Preburner
Preburner Boost Pump
Preburner Valve Actuator
Pneumatic Control Assembly
Recirculation Isolation Valve
Rated Power Levcl
Rotary Variable Differential Transformer
Solid Rocket Booster
Test Bed
Vehicle Engine Electronics Interface
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Rank No.: I
Component: Heat Exchanger (HEX)
Failure Mode: Coil fracture/leakage
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: AI50-01
Possible causes: (1) Coil weld or parent material fracture duc to fatigue. (2)
loss of channel/bracket supports, (3) damagc duc to imp:,.t
from fragmented liner, turning vancs, or channels, (a_
tube wall wear at support points, (5) tube damagc during
HPOTP removal and installation, and (6) coil collapse.
Possible effects: Mixing of GOX with fuel-rich hot gas stream could rcsult in
ignition, detonation, and burning. Burning would result in
coil, HGM liner or HPOTP turbine, or main injector burn-
through causing loss of engine. Fuel-rich hot gas could
enter the downstream side of the coil and combine with
oxygen from the bypass system, causing a fire in the
discharge line that supplies the POGO accumulator and the
vehicle oxygen pressurization system.
Available sensors: (1) HEX discharge pressure (F, TB), and (2) HEX interface
temperature (F, TB). Detection is difficult to accmnmodatc
Test correlalion with failtlrg mode: 901-222
Rank No.: 2
Component: Pneumatic Control Assembly (PCA) - Emergency Pneumatic Shutdown
Failure Mode: Failure to supply Helium pressurant
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: C200-11
Possible causes: (1) PCA .component failure (PCA inlet Helium filter
blocked, emergency pneumatic orifice blockcd), (2)
emergency shutdown solenoid valve failure (ar,naturc
jammed closed, push rod jammed closed, broken spring), (3)
vent port poppet/seat leakage (contamination.
damaged/defective sealing surface), and (4) comrol cavity
seal leakage (contamination, damaged/dcfcctivc scal_.
Pol_sible effects: If Helium pressurant is not applied to the closing pislon of
the main fuel valve (MFV) actuator, the MFV could drift.
causing propellant leakage which could in turn result in
fire, open air detonation, and overpressure condition.
Avtlilable sensors None, no sensor information would bc cffcclivc since.
wilhout a working PCA, the system can not be shtlldt/ven.
Tq,_I correlation w_lh failure mode: 750-163
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Rank No." 3
Component: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP)
Failure Mode. Structural Failure of Turbine Blades
Line Rcplaccaole Unit - Failure Mode No.: B200-04
Possible causes: (1) Rotor blade cracks, (2) loss of blade dampcr._, (3_
excessive tip rubbing, (4) tip seal failure, (5) housing pilot
lip failure (6) housing retaining lug failure, (7) nozzle
failure, (8) impact from macroscopic contaminant, (9) disk
fir-tree yielding or fracture, and (10) excessivc rubbing ot
platform seals.
Multiple blade failures resulting in immcdi:ttc l_s.,, <_[
turbine power and rotor imbalance. Rotor imh,_lzlnc¢
results in excessive vibration which would cause mc_rc
rubbing and additional component failures. Exlcnsivc
turbine damage could result from impact and
overtemperature, Possible burst of pump inlet duc to
pressure surge. Possible HPFTP seizure could resuh in LOX-
rich shutdown with subsequent main injector or fuel
preburner injector post damage/erosion.
Available :;gJJsors.: (1) HPFTP speed (F, TB), (2) LPFTP speed (F. TB), (3) IIPFI'
discharge pressure (F, TB), (4) HPFT discharge tcmper:ttttrc
(F, TB), (5) LPFT discharge pressure (F, TB), (6) LPF'I
discharge temperature (F, TB), and (7) FPB chamber
pressure (F, TB), (8) FPOV position (F, TB), (9) OPOV positit_
(F, TB), and (10) HPFTP housing strain (TB).
Test correlation wi_h failure mode: 902-249.
Rank No.: 4
Component: Nozz!c Assembly
Failure Mode: External Rupture
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A340-02
Pf_s,sibl_ causes: (1) Structural failure of the steerhorn, fccdlincs, mixer.
diffuser, forward and aft manifold, and (2) tube failure and
jacket fatigue.
Possible effects"
Av:_ilohlc sen,_or_
Overpressurization due to leakage external to the nozzle anti
into the aft compartment. Fragmentation may cause
damage to adjacent engines. Sudden loss of fuel causes LO.',,'-
rich operation.
(I) HPFT discharge temperature (F, TB), (2) HPFT discharge
pressure (F, TB), (3) HPOT discharge tcmpcraturc (F. TB), (4)
HPOT discharge pressure (F, TB), (5) FPOV pc_._i/icm {F. Ft3_.
and OPOV position (F, TB).
"_ ?Tc,q corrclati_n x_ilh failure mode: 901-485, 902-162, 750-041, 750-,_85. SF6-t')_,. SFlf)-I1]
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Rank No.: 5
Component: Fuel Valve
Failure Mode: Internal Leakage
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: DI10-01
Possible causes: (1) Damage/failure .of seal, bali, or bellows, and (21
contamination.
Possible effgqq_: (1) Fire due to leakage, and (2) open air detonation and
overpressure condition.
Available sensors: (1) HPFT discharge temperature (F, TB), (2) HPOT discharge
temperature (F, TB), (3) HPFT discharge pressure cF. TB), t4)
HPOT discharge pressure (F, TB), (5) FPOV position CF, TB).
(6) OI-'OV position (F, TB), (7) MCC coolant discharge
temperature _(F, TB), (8) MCC coolant discharge pressure (F,
TB), and (9) MCC pressure (F, TB).
Test correlation with failure mode: SF6-01
Rank No.: 6
Component: Fuel Preburner
Failure Mode: Non-uniformity of Fuel Flow in the Injector Element.
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A600-04
Possible causes: (1) contamination in the fuel annulus, and (2) slippage of
LOX post support pins.
Possible effects: Local high mixtures and recirculation of gases around the
elements periphery due to non-uniformity which, in turn.
causes local erosion of the injection element tip, the
injector faceplate, the combustion zone liner or injector
baffle. Erosion through the liner may result in burn-
through of the structural wall.
Available sensors: HPFT discharge temperature (F, TB), (2) FPB pressure (F.
TB), (3) FPB fuel manifold pressure (TB), and (4) FPB
oxidizer manifold pressure (TB).
Test correlation with failure mode,: SF10-01, 901-307, 902-244.
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Rank N¢.: 7
Component: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP)
Failure Mode: Loss of support or position contr61.
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B200-15
Possible causes: (1) Bearing failure (ball/cage failure, loss of coolant.
corrosion, contamination, race failures, (2)
fracture/distortion of bearing carrier or excessive loss of
bolt preload, (3) excessive loss of bearing retaining nut
preload, (4) excessive clearance at pump interstage seals,
(5) failure or excessive wear of bearing preioad spring, (6)
pump slinger pin failure, and (7) stud failure or loss of
preload.
Possible effects: Reduced speed, flow and pump output pressure, and
increased vibration levels. Possible turbine blade failure
or disintegration of rotating assembly.
Available sensors: (1) HPFTP speed (F, TB), (2) HPFTP discharge pressure (F.
TB), (3) fuel flowrate (F, TB), (4) HPFTP radial and axial
accelerometers (F, TB), (5) HPFP balance cavity prcs.surc
(TB), and (6) HPFP thrust bearing speed C'TB).
T_,51 _orr¢lali0n wil, h f:_ilurg mode: none
Rank No.: 8
Component: Main Injector
Failure Mode: LOX post crack
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A21111.6
Possible causes: (1) Impact damage, (2) weld or material flaws, (3) fatigue.
(4) scrub liner failure, (5) heat shield retainer failure, (61
secondary faceplate retainer failure, and (7) loss of flow
shield function.
Possible effects: Post and injector burnout as a result of hot gas flowing into
the posts and igniting with the oxidizer. Injcctor debris,
can rupture nozzle tubes, causing prcburncr fuel
starvation, turbine and main injector burnout, zlnd _fl
compartment overpressurization and fire.
Available sensors: (1) HPOT discharge temperature (F, TB), (2) HPFT discharge
temperature (F, TB), (3) HPOT discharge pressure (F, TB), (4i
HPFT discharge pressure (F, TB), (5) HPOP speed (F, TB), I_'_)
HPFP speed (F, TB), (7) OPOV position (F, TB). (8) FPOV
position (F, TB), and (9) MCC pressure (F, TB).
Test forr¢lation wilh failure mode: 901-173, 901-183, 901-331, 902-198, 750-148.
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Rank No. : 9
Component: Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump (LPFTP)
Failure Mode: Fuel leakage fast liftoff seal.
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B600-06
Possible causes: (I) Contamination, (2) damaged sealing surfaces on liftoff
seal or shaft, (3) binding within liftoff seal, (4) leakage past
static seal at liftoff, seal to manifold interface, and (5)
damage due to failure to liftoff..
Possible effects:
Available sensors:
Fuel flow into the turbine and through the MCC and nozzle
with the possible result of open air fire/detonation.
(1) LPFTP discharge pressured, (2) LPFTP shaft spccd, (31
LPFTP discharge HF pressure, (4) LPFTP turbine inlcl
pressure, (5) LPFTP turbine pressure drop, and (6_ LPFTJ-
radial accelerometer.
Test correlation with failure mode: None.
Rank No.: 10
Component: High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump. (HPOTP)
Failure Mode: Turbine Blade structural failure.
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B400-03
Possible causes: (1) Blade cracks, (2) rotor blade tip rubbing, (3) honcycom,5
retainer failure, (4) impact, (5) inadequate cooling Ilow. (6)
loss of damper function, (7) operation t resonance, (8) d_.,t_
fir-tree yielding and fracture, and (9) nozzle failure.
Pg_;sible effects: Loss of turbine blades, leading to multiple blade failure and
rotor unbalance, with subsequent rubbing and ultimate
rotating assembly disintegration.
Available sensors: (1) Strain gages near shaft, and (2) acceleromctcr.
Test correlation with fail_r¢ mode: None.
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Rank No.: 1 I
Component: High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP)
Failure Mode: Loss of Axial Balancing Force
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B400-14
Possible causes: (1) Damage to balance piston orifices from contanaination,
and (2) Loss of bolt preload causing rubbing in the balance
piston region.
Possible effects: Excessive shaft axial displacement resulting in internal
rubbing of rotating components. Disintegration of rotating
parts will occur at high speeds.
Av_illible sensors: (1) Strain gage near shaft, and (2) HPOTP preburner
accelerometer.
Test correlation with failure mode: none
Rank No.: 12
Component: High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP)
Failure Mode: Failure to Transient Torque
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B400-07
Possible causes: (1) Failure of shaft or impeller splines, (2) Curvic coupling
failure, (3) Loss of turbine tie - bolt preload, (4) Loss of
preburner tie-bolt preload, (5) Main impeller retainer
nut/lock failure, (6) Turbine disc failure, and (7) Shafl
failure.
Possible effects:
Available sensors:
Turbine unload and overspeed with probable bladc failurc
and/or disk burst, rubbing, and rotor unbalance. Turbine
burst may cause shrapnel damage to other parts of thc
engine, resulting in ultimate rotating assembly
disintegration, fire, or explosion.
(1) HPOTP pump speed, (2) HPOTP discharge prcssurc, (3)
HPOTP discharge temperature, (4) Strain gagcs, and 15)
Accelerometer.
Test corr¢lotion wilh failure too. de: 750-175.
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Rank No.: 13
Component: Main Injector
Failure Mc.:le: Interpropellant Plate Cracks
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A200-09
Possible causes: (1) Weld or parent material failure, and (2) Heat shield
failure.
Possible effects: Ignition occurring in the main injector resulting in
injeetor/powerhead burnout, and aft compartment
overpressurization and fire. LOX/post damage, MCC erosion,
and nozzle tube rupture may result.
Available sensors: (1) HPFTP discharge temperature, and (2) HPOT discharge
temperature.
Test correlation with failure mode,: 901-173, 750-148.
Rank No.: 14
Component: High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Failure Mode: Pump Piece Part Structural Failure
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B400-22
Possible causes: Internal structural failure of shaft, main housing,
preburner pump housing, intermediate seal, mating ring,
and other hardware (springs, nuts, washers, bolls, scals_,
etc.
Possible effects: Fire from LOX impact or rubbing, hot gas leakage into
primary OX seal cavity.
Available sensor,s: (1) HPOTP turbine discharge pressure, (2) HPOTP turbine
discharge HF pressure, (3) HPOTP discharge temperature,
and (4) I-IPOTP radial and axial accelerometers.
Test correlation with failure mode,: 901-110.
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Rank No.: 15
Component: Main Combustion Chamber
Failure Mode: Fuel Leaks into the Closed Cav,ty Between the Liner and Structural
Jacket
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A330-02
Possible cause_: (1) Failure in EDNi liner closeout structure caused by long
liner inner wall cracks; (2) Jacket EB closeout weld over
penetration into EDNi liner; and (3) Fracture of manifold to
liner welds.
Possible effects: Burst diaphragm rupture due to leakage into the closed
cavity, venting the cavity into the engine fuel drain
system. Excessive leakage causes deformation of the liner
in the divergent section. Significant changes in the
exhaust gases flow produce a strong shock at the
downstream nozzle wall. Tube failures cause loss of fuel to
the preburners and high turbine temperatures. Cavity
overpressurization causes ripping of welds, sudden loss of
fuel, engine turbine, and aft compartment
overpressurization and fire.
Available _ensor_: (1) MCC liner cavity delta-pressure, (2) FPB fuel manifold
pressure, (3) OPB LOX manifold pressure, (4) MCC coolant
delta pressure, (5) FPOV actuator position, (6) OPOV actuator
position, (7) HPFTP turbine discharge temperature, (8)
HPOTP turbine discharge temperature, (9) HPFTP pump
discharge pressure, (I0) I-IPFTP boost pump discharge
pressure, (11) LPFTI: shaft speed, (12) LPFTP pump
discharge pressure, and (13) HPOTP pump discharge
pressure,
Test c0rr¢lati_n with .failure mo_t_: None
Rank No.: 16
Component: LPFTP Turbine Discharge Duct
Failure Mode: Fails to Contain Hydrogen
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: KI03-01
Possible causes: (1) Parent material failure or weld failure; and (2_ Flcx
joint assemblies structural failure of retainer assembly.
internal support assembly, inner bellows, or welds.
Possible effects: Fuel leakage into aft compartment resulting in
overpressurization and possible fire or detonation.
Available sensor_: (1) HPFTP inlet HF pressure, (2) Fuel flow, (3) LPFTP
discharge HF pressure, (4) HPFTP axial accelerometer, (5)
HPFTP radial accelerometer, and (6) HPFTP shaft specd.
Test correl_lion with failure mode: None
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Rank No.: 17
Component: GOX Control Valve
Failure Mode: Maintain Structural .Integrity
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: D500-06
Possible causes:
Possible effects:
(1) Fracture of housing; and (2) Internal structural failure
of poppet, check valve poppet, GCV or check valve retainer,
seat, stem, guide, poppet spring or check valve snapspring,
guide retainer ring, and check valve seal.
(1) Loss of pogo suppression flow and overpressurization of
aft compartment; and (2) Fire from GOX impact or rubbing.
Available sensors: (1) LPOTP pump discharge HF pressure, (2) LPOTP pump
discharge pressure, (3) LPOTP pump discharge temperature,
(4) HPOTP inlet HF pressure.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 18
Component: Anti-Flood Valve
Failure Mode: Leakage During Propellant Conditioning
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: D300-01
Possible cause_i: (1) Poppet or seat damage, (2) Contami_,:,,ion, and (3)
Fractured poppet or piston springs.
Possible effects: LOX flow to heat exchanger. Heat from start will cause GOX
to overpressurize and rupture the heat exchanger coils.
LOX and hot-gas will mix resulting in uncontained
fire/explosion.
Available sensors: (1) HEX vent inlet pressure, (2) HEX vent delta-pressure, (3_
HEX inlet temperature, and (4) HEX inlet pressure.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 19
Component: High Pressure Fuel Duct
Failure Mode: Fails to Contain Hydrogen
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: K106-02
Possible causes: Parent material or weld failure.
Possible effects:
Availabl_: sensor,s:
Fuel leakage into aft compartment resulting in
overpressurization and possible fire or detonation.
(1) HPFTP discharge pressure, and (2) HPFTP discharge tcmp
T.g.st correlation with failure mode: None
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Rank No.: 20
Component: Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Failure Mode: Loss of Support and Position Control
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B800-06
Possible causes: (1) High rotor axial thrust loads; (2) Pump/turbine end
bearing failure due to wear, spalling, pitting, cage
wear/failure, corrosion, loss of coolant or contamination;
(3) Loss of support bolt preload; (4) Loss of pump/turbine
end bearing inner sad outer race retaining nut preload duc
to nut failure, lock failure, or vibration; (5) Turbine end
bearing preload spring wear/failure; (6) Excessive fretting
at bearing journals; and (7) Excessive rotor radial loads.
Possible effects: Potential contact between rotor and stationary components
due to excessive rotor movement; rubbing in oxygen
environment can cause LPOTP fire or. explosion.
Available sensors: (1) LPOTP radial accelerometer, and (2) LPOTP pump
discharge temperature.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 21
Component: Main Injector
Failure Mode: External Rupture
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A200-07
Possible causes: (1) Weld or parent material failure; (2) Splitter failure; and
(3) Liquid metal embrittlement at braze areas.
Possible effects: LOX and hot-gas leakage into the aft compartment resulting
in overpressurization and fire.
Available sensors: (1) MCC pressure, (2) Main injector secondary face plate
delta-pressure, (3) MCC liner cavity delta-pressure, (4) MCC
fuel injection pressure, (5) FPB fuel manifold pressure, (61
OPB LOX manifold pressure, (7) FPOV actuator positiol_, (_)
OPOV actuator position, (9) HPFTP turbine dischargc
temperature, (10) HPOTP turbine discharge temperature,
(11) HPFTP pump discharge pressure, (12) HPFTP boost
pump discharge pressure, (13) LPFTP shaft speed. (141
LPFTP pump discharge pressure, and (15) HPOTP pump
discharge pressure.
Test correl_li0n with failure mode: None
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Rank No.: 22
Component: Chamber Coolant Valve Actuator
Failure Mode: Sequence Valve Leaks Passing Early Control Pressurant Downstream
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: E150-14
Possible causes: Damaged sequence valve and valve seals.
Possible effects: The control pressurant closes the purge sequence PAV
early with the result of terminating preburner shutdown
purges_ HPOTP intermediate seal purge, and pogo shutdown
charge. Loss of pogo shutdown charge during MECO, at zero
6 condition and minimum NPSP, will result in
eavitation/overspeed of HPOTP and/or LPOTP.
Available sensors: (1) HPOTP inlet HF pressure. (2) LPOTP inlet pressure. (3)
LPOTP shaft speed, (4) HPOTP turbine radial accelerometer.
(5) FPB purge pressure, (6) OPB purge pressure, and (7)
HPOTP intermediate seal purge pressure.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 23
Component: Oxidizer Bleed Valve
Failure Mode: Fretting of Internal Parts
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: D220-06
Possible causes:
Possible effects:
Available sensors:
Relative motion of poppet/piston and
poppet/spring/poppet.
Fire from ignition of internal parts.
Not detectable.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
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Rank No.: 24
Component: High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Failure Mode: Turbine P'eee Part Structural Failure
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B400-23
Possible causes: Internal structural failure of turbine housing, discharge
strut/strut retainer, shaft, disc, first-stage turbine blades
and dampers, first-stage tip seal and retainer, first stage
nozzle., second-stage turbine blade and dampers, second-
stage tip seal, second-stage nozzle, interstage seal, jet ring,
bellows shield, turbine seal coolant shield, discharge strut
retainer disc bolt and washer, turbine blade lock, first-
stage nozzle retainer bolts and lock, first-stage nozzle
ietainer bolts and washers, jet ring retainer bolts and
washers, turbine seal retainer bolts and locks, and first
s,age nozzle plug.
Possible effects: Migration downstream of part fragment resulting in
puncture of heat exchanger tube.
Available sensors: (1) HPOTP turbine discharge pressure, (2) HPOTP turbinc
discharge HF pressure, (3) HPOTP discharge temperature,
and (4) HPOTP radial and axial acceleromcters.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 25
Component: Main Combustion Chamber
Failure Mode: Internal Rupture at the MCC Nozzle Interface
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A330-03
Possible causes: (1) Delamination of the nickel plating at the aft end of the
MCC; (2) Weld failures at the turnaround manifold of thc
liner, and (3) Weld or parent material failure.
Possible effects: Fuel leakage at the internal interface to be dumped into the
main exhaust gases. Loss of fuel to the LPFTP will result in
HPFTP cavitation, LOX-rich operation, and engine failure
Available sensors: (I) HPOT discharge temperature.
Test correlation with failure mode: 750-148
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Rank No.: 26
Component: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Failure Mode: Structural" Failure
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B200-26
Possible causes: (1) Failure of parent metal or welds in main housing, inlet
housing, thrust bearing housing; and (2) Diffuser cracking
causing overpressurization of pump housing.
Possible effects: (1) Immediate loss of turbopump output; and (2) External
damage to engine from hydrogen fire or explosion and aft
compartment overpressurization.
Available sensors: (1) HPFP discharge pressure, (2) Housing strain
measurements, and (3) Housing accelerometer.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 27
Component: Oxidizer Bleed Flex Line
Failure Mode: Fails to Contain Oxidizer
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: K203-01
Possible causes: (1) Parent material failure or weld failure; and (2)
Damage/defective bellows assembly.
Possible effects: (1) Oxidizer leakage into and overpressurization of aft
compartment.
Available sensors: No engine sensors.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 28
Component: Main Oxidizer Valve
Failure Mode: Piece Part Structural Failure
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: D120-0S
Possible causes: Internal structural failure of bellows, cam follower,
inlet/outlet sleeve, shaft bearing retainer, cam/shaft
bearing, ball/shaft seal, shaft assembly, and fasteners and
cupwashers.
Possibl_ _ ff_qls: Fire from LOX impact or rubbing.
Avail_.bl¢ s_nsors: (1) MOV discharge HF pressure, and (2) MOV hydraulic
temperature.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
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Rank No.: 29
Component: Powerhead
Failure Mode: Shell or Propellant Duct Rupture
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A050-02
possible causes: Weld or parent metal failure.
Possible effects: (1) External fuel or hot-gas leak; and (2) Overpressurization
of aft compartment.
Avi_ilable sensors: (1) MCC pressure, (2) Main injector secondary face plate
delta-pressure, (3) MCC liner cavity delta-pressure, (4) MCC
fuel injection pressure, (5) FPB fuel manifold pressure. (6)
OPB LOX manifold pressure, (7) FPOV actuator position, (_)
OPOV actuator position, (9) HPFTP turbine discharge
temperature, (10) HPOTP turbine discharge temperalu_.
(11) HPFTP pump discharge pressure, (12) HPFTP boost
pump discharge pressure, (13) LPFTP shaft speed, (14)
LPFTP pump discharge pressure, and (15)HPOTP pump
discharge pressure.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 30
Component: Fuel Preburner
Failure Mode: External Rupture
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A600-11
Possible causes: Failure of parent material or weld.
Possible ¢ ffe_:ts:
Available sensors:
Leakage into the aft compartment causing
overpressurization and/or fire.
(1) FPB injector delta-pressure, (2) FPB temperature. (31
FPB fuel manifold temperature, (4) FPB ASI fuel
temperature, (5) FPB orifice inlet temperature, (6) FPB
accelerometer, (7) FPB liner axial temperature, (8) FPB
manifold pressure, (9) FPB chamber HF pressure, and (10_
FPB chamber HP delta-pressure.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
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Rank No.: 3 1
Component: Main Oxidizer Valve
Failure Mode: Structural Failure
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: D120-04
Possible causes: Fracture of housing or end cap.
Possible effects: (1) Reduced oxidizer flow to engine; and (2) High pressure
oxidizer leakage into aft compartment.
Available sensors: (1) MOV discharge HF pressure, and (2) MOV hydraulic
temperature.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 32
Component: Pneumatic Control Assembly (PCA) - Oxidizer System Purge
Failure Mode: Insufficient or No Nitrogen Purge Flow During Propellant Conditioning
Line Replaceable Unit Failure Mode No.: C200-07
Pg_ible causes: (1) PCA component failure due to blocked/restricted PCA
inlet nitrogen filter, ruptured PCA oxidizer system bursl
diaphragm, blocked/restricted HPOTP intermediate scal
purge control orifice, or blocked/restricted MCC oxidizcr
dome purge control orifice; (2) Oxidizer system purge
pressure activated valve failure; (3) Control cavity seal
leakage due to contamination, damaged/defective seal, or
blocked flow passage; and (4) Vent port poppet/seat leakage
due to contamination, damaged/defective sealing surface,
or damaged guide.
Pgssible effects: (1) Reduced nitrogen flow causing loss of oxidizer dome
purge resulting in uncleared moisture and ice formation;
LOX orifices block can cause combustion within the post,
post burn through, and extensive erosion during start;
uncontained engine damage; (2) Reduced flow causing loss
of intermediate seal purge resulting in uncleared moisturc
and ice formation during propellant drop; ice damages
HPOTP intermediate seal causing failure; LOX and hot-
turbine gases mix resulting in uncontained enginc dam:tgc
during start; and (3) Loss of purge reduces the purge flow
below acceptable limits for inerting propellant leakage at
ICD limits with the potential result of open air fire.
Available sensors: Preburner purge monitor patch (OPB and FPB purge
pressure redlines)
TeSt _:9rrelation with failure monte: 901-129, 902-330
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Rank No.: 33
Comoonent: Main Injector
Failt, re Mode: Partial Blockage of an Oxidizer Orifice
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A200-05
Pgssible causes: Local contamination in oxidizer manifold.
Possible effects: Combustion gas backflow into the post causing combustion
within the post and post burn - through as a result of
blockage. Extensive subsequent erosion results in aft
compartment overpr¢ssurization and fire.
A_.bl e _ensors: (1) Main injector secondary face plate delta-pressure, (21
HGM fuel transfer duct HF pressure, (3) Main injector LOX
injection pressure, and (4) Main injector LOX injection
temperature.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 34
Component: Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve
Failure Mode: Shaft Seal Leak
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: D130-03
Pgssible causes: (1) Contamination generated from coupling.
Possible effects: (]) Leakage past both the primary and secondary seals
results in burst diaphragm rupture; and (2) IF hydraulic
fluid leakage from the actuator primary and secondary
seals exist concurrently, commingling of oxidizer and
hydraulic fluid will result in fire_
Available _ensors: (1) FPB ASI LOX orifice pressure, (2) FPB ASI LOX orifice
delta-pressure, (3) FPB ASI LOX temperature, and (4) FPB
actuator position.
Test _Qrrcl0tion with failure mQd¢: None
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Rank No.: 35
Component: Main Oxidizer Valve
Failure Mode: Fretting of Internal Parts
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: D120-06
Possibl_ causes: (1) Relative motion of (i) bellows/housing, (ii)
sleeve/bellows shim, (iii) cam follower/guide/housing.
(iv) bellows/guide cam follower, (v) shaft
bearings/retainer, (vi) retainer/shaft, (vii) retainer/wave
washers/cap, and (viii) outlet sleeve/housing/shim.
Possible effects: (1) Fire from ignition of internal pans.
Available sensors: (1) MOV discharge HF pressure, and (2) MOV hydraulic
temperature.
Test correlation with failure mode: 901-225.
Rank No.: 36
Component: High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Failure Mode: Loss of Support, Position Control, or Rotordynamic Stability
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B400-13
Possible cause_: (1) Bearing failure due to spalling, pitting, wear or
corrosion of balls/races; loss of radial clea_'ance; cage
failure; 10ss of coolant; or contamination in bearings; (2)
Excessive PBP damping seal clearance; (3) Loss of bearing
retaining bolt preload; (4) Cartridge wet failure or loss of
support; (5) Loss of bearing retainer nut preload; (6)
Bearing preload spring failure; (7) Excessive turbine
interstage seal clearance; (8) Excessive primary and
secondary turbine seal clearance; (9) Fretting of
bearing/cartridge or isolator; and (10) Loss or increase ol
deadband.
Possible effects: (1) Bearing failure results in excessive axial or radial
displacements which leads to rubbing of turbine or pump
components; disintegration of rotating parts, possibly
resulting in an oxidizer fire or explosion.
Available sensors: (1) HPOT speed (F, TB), (2) HPOT discharge pressure (F, TB),
(3) HPOT discharge temperature (F, TB), and (4) HPOTP
radial and axial accelerometers (F, TB).
Test correlation wilh fitilur¢ mode: 901-136
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Rank No.: 37
Component: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Failure Mode: Turbine Discharge Flow Blockage
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B200-07
Possible causes: (1) Turnaround duct distortion/buckling; (2) Sheet meted
cracking resulting in loss of pieces; (3) stiffener vane
cracking resulting in loss of pieces or disengagement of
slip joint; and (4) Failure of coolant liner.
Possible effects: (1) Flow blockage decreases turbine pressure ratio, reduces
turbopump speed, flow and discharge pressure. Decreased
flow is sensed by controller which increases fuel
preburner oxidizer flow; (2) A rapid buckling may result i,
extensive turbine damage from overtemperature; and (3t
Possible burst of pump inlet due _e pressure surge.
Available sensors: (1) HPFTP discharge temperature, (2) HPFTP pump spced.
(3) Flowrate, (4) HPFTP discharge pressure, and (5) Strain
gage for turn around duct metal.
Test correlation with failure mode: 901-340, 901-363, 902-118, 901-436.
Rank No.: 3 8
Component: High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Failure Mode: Loss of Coolant to First- and Second-Stage Turbine Components
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B400-20
Possible causes: (1) Fracture or blockage of coolant circuits; (2) Coolant
passage cracks into main housing, (3) Jet ring failure, (4)
Failure of second-stage nozzle/interstage seal, and (5)
OPB/HPOTP pressure-assisted seal leakage.
Possible effects: (1) Overheating of inlet strut, disks and blades, nozzle box
structures, and turbine interstage seal lead to flow
distortion and rubbing; and (2) Structural component
failure results in disintegration of rotating components.
Available sensors: (I) HPOTP primary seal drain temperature, (2) HPOTP
primary seal drain pressure, (3) HPOTP turbine seal cavity
pressure, (4) HPOTP turbine radial accelerometer, (5) HPOTP
turbine discharge pressure, and (6) HPOTP turbine
discharge HF pressure.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
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Rank No.: 39
Component: Anti-Flood Valve
Failure Mode: LOX Flow Restricted or Shutoff
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: D300-03
Possible causes: (1) Blocked inlet filter; (2) Vent passage blocked and
cracked piston/piston seal leakage; and (3) Fractured
poppet/seat.
Possible effects: (1) Loss of prcssurant flow to accumulator and vehicle; (2)
Collapse and possible cracking of heat exchanger coil; (3)
Hot-gas flow to vehicle oxidizer tank and pogo accumulator;
and (4) Loss of pogo suppression.
Availab!_ sensors: (1) HEX vent inlet pressure, (2) HEX vent delta-pressure, (3)
HEX inlet temperature. (4) HEX inlet pressure, (5) Oxidizer
tank pressure, and (6) LPOTP pump discharge pressure.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 40
Component: Oxidizer Preburner
Failure Mode: Loss of Fuel to ASI
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: A700-02
possible causes: Contamination of the ASI fuel orifices/passageways
Possible effects: High mixture ratio erosion of the ASI combustion chamber
walls, injector burnout, loss of turbine, and engine faiJurc
due to loss of fuel.
.Available sensors: (1) FPOV valve position, (2) OPOV valve position, and (3)
HPOT discharge temperature.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
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Rank No.: 41
Component: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Failure Mode: Loss of Coolant Flow to Turbine Bearings
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: !1200-16
Possible causes: (1) Lift-off sealing binding/closure; (2) Coolan! flow
passage blockage; (3) Failure of turbine hub labyrinth scal;
(4) Failure of vortex control paddle or its torque pin on
shaft-end; and (5) Hot-gas leakage past Kaiser cap to
turbine bearing carrier interface due to static seal failure;
thermal shield failure, nut failure, or Kaiser cap failure.
Possible effects: (1) Bearings overheat and fail, causing rubbing, increascd
vibration and possible turbine blade failure or
disintegration of rotating assembly.
Available sensors: (1) HPOTP turbine radial accelerometer, (2) HPOTP turbine
axial accelerometer, (3) HPOTP turbine discharge
temperature, (4) HPOTP turbine discharge pressure. (5)
HPOTP primary seal drain pressure, and (6) HPOTP primary
seal drain temperature.
Test ccrrelation with failure mode: 901-364, 902-209, 750-165
Rank No.: 42
Component: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Failure Mode: Loss of Coolant Flow to Turbine Discs
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: 11200-17
Possible causes: (1) Lift-off sealing binding/closure; (2) Coolant flow
passage blockage; (3) Failure of turbine hub labyrinth seal:
(4) Failure of vortex control paddle or its torque pin on
shaft-end; and (5) Failure of inter,stage seal.
Possible effects: (1) Loss of coolant to one side of disc can allow disc
deflection and platform seal rubbing; and (2) Excessive
coolant loss can allow turbine first-stage or second-stagc
disc to overheat and burst.
Available sensors: (I) HPOTP turbine radial accelerometer, (2) HPOTP turbine
axial accelerometer, (3) HPOTP turbine discharge
temperature, (4) HPOTP turbine discharge pressure, (5)
HPOTP primary seal drain pressure, and (6) HPOTP primary
seal drain temperature.
q'¢$t ¢¢rr¢lation with failure mode: 901-364, 902-209, 750-165
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Rank No.: 43
Component: High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Failure Mode: Loss of Coolant to Bearings
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B400-18
Possible causes: (1) Blockage of turbine and bearing coolant circuits; and
(2) leakage past aft preburner pump pressure assisted
seal.
Possible effects: (1) Bearings degrade causing rubbing and disintegration of
rotating components.
Available sensors: (1) HPOTP turbine radial accelerometer, (2) HPOTP turbine
axial accelerometer, (3) HPOT shaft speed, (4) HPOTP turbine
discharge pressure, (5) HPOTP turbine discharge
temperature, (6) HPOTP turbine seal cavity pressure, and
(7) HPOTP primary seal drain pressure.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
Rank No.: 44
Component: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Failure Mode: Failure to Restrain Shaft Movement During Turbopump Startup
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B200-24
.P_.o._i b 1e causes: (1) Failure of thrust - carrying ball bearing due to ball,
cage, or race failure, corrosion or contamination; (2)
Failure of thrust ball; and (3) Failure of shaft insert.
Possible effects: (1) Excess shaft movement can result in rubbing of
components causing turbopump performance degradation:
(2) Controller senses decreased flow and increases fuel
preburner oxidizer flow; and (3) Increased turbine
discharge temperature.
Available _en_gr_: (1) HPFTP turbine accelerometer, (2) HPFTP turbine
discharge temperature, (3) HPFTP discharge pressure, (4)
HPFTP shaft speed, (5) HPFTP housing strain, and (6) FPOV
actuator position.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
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Rank No.: 45
Component: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Failure Mode: Loss of Balancing Cap.btlity
Line Replaceable Unit - Failure Mode No.: B200-23
Possible causes: (1) High pressure orifice failure; and (2) Low pressurc
orifice failure.
Possible effects: (1) Rubbing of turbine platform seals, and/or rubbing of
third-stage impeller back shroud against low pressure
orifice results in reduced turbopump performance, damagc
to rubbing parts, and reduced coolant flow to turbine; and
(2) Possible pump inlet burst due to pressure surge.
Available sensors: (1) HPFTP inlet temperature, (2) HPFTP inlet pressure, (3)
HPFTP inlet HF pressure, (4) HPFTP turbine discharge
temperature, (5) HPFTP discharge pressure, (6) HPFTP
discharge I-IF pressure, (7) HPFTP shaft speed, and (8) HPFTP
turbine - accelerometers.
Test correlation with failure mode: None
/
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ATTACHMENT 4
CHANGES IN INDIVIDUAL MEASUREMENTS FOR SELECTED
DEGRADATIONS
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ATTACHMENT 5
SUMMARY OF EXPECTED PLUME CONTAMINANTS
KEY TO ATTACHMENT 5
Column 1 - SSME FMEA Failure Mode Designation
Field 1 (1 digit) Component Type, example: B200-15
A = COMBUSTION DEVICES
B = TURBOMACHINERY
C = PNEUMATICS
D = PROPELLANT VALVES
E = ACTUATORS
F = CONTROLLER/FASCOS
G = IGNITERS
H = ELECTRICAL HARNESSES
J = SENSORS/INSTRUMENTATION
K = LINES AND DUCTS
L = JOINTS
M = GIMBAL
N = ORIFICES
Field 2 (3 digits) Specific Component Designation, example: B200-15
Field 3 (2 digits) Failure Mode Designation, example: B200-15
Column 2 - Specific Component (corresponds to field 2 of column 1)
Column 3 - Reaction Time: imm(ediate) -- 0-1 second
sec(onds) = 1 - 60 seconds
min(utes) = 1 - 60 minutes
Column 4 - Cause or Effect of Failure Mode (null = effect)
Column 5 - Component Within Assembly Expected to Contaminate Plume
Column 6 - Material(s) Corresponding to Column 5 Component
Column 7 - Composition of Materials in Column 6 (%wt)
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TREND ALGORITHM RESULTS - TEST 901-364
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ATTACHMENT 7
TREND ALGORITHM RESULTS - TEST 901-225
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ATTACHMENT 8
START TRANSIENT FLEETWIDE OPERATING ENVELOPES
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ATTACHMENT 9
START TRANSIENT ANOMALY INDICATIONS - TEST 902-132
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Figure-2 : HPFP Speed
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Figure-3 : HPFP Discharge Temperature
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Figure-4: Low Pressure Fuel Turbine Inlet Pressure
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Figure-5 : Facility Fuel Flowrate (CH-A)
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Figure-6 : Facility Fuel Flowra_e (CH-B)
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Figure-7: Oxidizer Preburner Chambe=- Pressur _-
228
20"
oo_
QOQ
Q_Q
• i
153±-I_qnW o
I
/
/
-rr.
!
/
,G
6_
4.
u_
0
e
0
Figure-B: Fuel Preburner Chamber Pressure
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Figure-9: HPFP Coolant Liner Pressure
w
(z
Z
W
E
0
Q_
b.
W
230
20"
I
k
_r9
_YT" I
i i-4
i
'I
I
I 5 3 I - I I I DW @_
/
/
/
o
O
O
O
D
" O
Figure-10: HPFP Balance Cavity Pressure
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Figure-ll: Main Chamber Pressure
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ATTACHMENT 10
SSME FLIGHT AND FACILITY MEASUREMENTS
KEY TO ATTACHMENT 10
Column 1 - Parameter Identification Number
Column 2 - Measurement System Identification Number
FIELD NO. ! (FIRST CHARACTER1 FIELD NO. Z {_ECOND & I_IRD CHARACTERS)
A - GROUND TEST ARTICLE 07 - AEROOYNANIC/THERMOOYHAMICS
E - MAIN ENGINE 08 - STRUCTUAJM. DYN/_J41CS
F - FACILITY 09 - THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM (TPS)
G - GSE 35 - AFT FUSELAGE
T - ET 38 - PURGE AND VENT
V - ORBITER 41 - MAIN PROPULSION
48 - ET DTI
49 - S_II_ GTI
FIELD NO. 3 (FOURTH CHARACTER} 58 - HYDRAULIC
79 - FLIGHT CONTROL
C - CURRENT
O - VIBRATION
G - FORCE/STRESS/STRAIN FIEIrO NO. 4 (FIFTH THRU EIGHTH _)
H - POSITION
K - STIMULUS 0001 - 8999 Glel HEA_IILEMENTS
M ° MULTI- DATA 9000 - 9999 OF| 14EASUREMENTS
P - PRESSURE OOU1 - 9999 GTI/OTI MEASUREMENTS
Q - QUANTITY (NUI'IBERED SEQUENTIALLY FOR FIELDS
R - PATE ONE AND 'riCO)
T - T_ERATURE
V ° VOLTAGE
w - TIME
X - DISCREET EVENT
Y - ACOUSTICS
FIELD NO. 5 (NINTH CHARACTER)
DATA TYPE DATA ROUTING
"ANALOG I EVENT DIGITAL (MAY BE MULTIPLEI
" A , E O OFI_FI
_ I ((J_ L/U bUKU {ALL _',M_ UAIA WUI_U'_}
C [ X FLIGHT CRITICAL MOM
I B EIu i MEGAI_IT TO SAYS
K I M GROHtlI) lF..51
K I K GTM OR STIMULI ON FLT CRIT t,l)M
H l W GROUND TEST HARDWIRE
F I CUNI I t_JUU_ ._/ GtfAL
I N G_O DECODER HERS VJA FLT CRIT MOM
I P PARE{'Ir HORD
FIELD NO. 6 (TENTH CHARACTER, IF USED)
•IDENTIFIES TWO ACQUISITION REQUIREMENTS FOR O/_E TRANSDUCER/SIGNAL
COHDITIDrIER.
T IDEI'_TIFIESA PCM MEASUREMENT THAT IS DECOMMUTATED FOR RECORDING BY A
SYSTEM OTHER THA_N PCM.
Column 3 - Measurement Units
Column 4 - Name of Measurement
233
OF POOR QUALITY
SSME Flight Measurements (1 of 3)
• - TITLES UTILITY e2e289 Vd6.e2 .o
$SME FADS OATA FOR STS3eR ME-I 6eK8
FULL NAME _ DATl:FLTe29.C13/G
TEST NUMBER _ e29eee1
TEST STANO _ 6
CUTOFF TIME _ 515.32
NUMBER OF PIDS m 13e
FILE FORMAT _ D
PID MSID UNITS _
TIME SECONDS
4 E41M1eeSP*
5 E41Mle78P
6 E41Mle79P
7 E41M1e8eP
8 Ea1UlegSD UNITS
12 E41Tle2eO OEGR
15 E41Tle190 DEGR
17 E41Pl@670 PSIA
18 E41Tle7eo DEGR
21 E41TI12eD DEGR
24 E41PIe66D PSIA
3e E41Rle730 RPM
32 E41Rle72D RPM
24 E41Ple68D PSIA
36 E41H1e240 PCT
38 E41Hle25D PCT
44_ E41H1e280 PCT
42 E41Hle27D PCT
45 E41Hl@260 PCT
46 E41Hle62D PCT
47 E41Hle610 PCT
48 E41Ple690 PSIA
49 E41T1e710 OEGR
5e E41Vle740 VAC
51 E41Vl@750 VAC
52 E41Ple2gO PSIA
53 E41PIeeSD PSIA
54 E41PleegD PSIA
58 E41P1e31D PSIA
59 E41P1e32D I_Ia
63 E41P1e23D PSIA
78 E41V1118D VOC
79 E41Vlt190 VOC
86 E41P1e180 PSIA
9e E41Ple3eO PSIA
91 E41Ple510 PSIA
92 E41Ple53D PSIA
94 E41TI125D DEGR
96 E41RIe22D GAL/MIN
lee E41Rle210 C_kL,/M[N
Ie4 E41Ml121P
129 E41Ple350 PSIA
13e E41Ple380 PSIA
131 E41R1e370 GAL/1,iIN
122 E41Rle280 GAL/MIN
133 E41Rleseo GAL/MIN
136 E41H1e4eO PCT
137 E41H1e84D PCT
138 E41HIe410 PCT
ENGINE 2e27 CONTROLLER F23
TITLE
TIME IN SECONDS
HARD FAIL IO MI[-I
HARD FAIL TST NO1 _-1
HARD FAIL _ NO2 ME-1
HARO FAIL TST NO3 I_-1
MIX RATIO I_-I
PBP D$ TMP AVG _.--I
HPF'P IN TMP AV_ ME-I
MCC CI,.NT I_J PR A ME-I
MCC CLNT DS I"MP 8 ME-I
MCC OXID INJ TE)_ ME-1
MCC PIG INJ PR A )41[-1
LPOP SPEED B ME-I
LPFP SPEED A ME-1
HX OS PR B ME-1
MF'V ACT POS A ME--1
MOV ACT POS A ME-I
OPOV ACT POS A ME-1
FI_V ACT I=OS A ME-1
CCV ACT POS A ME-1
LOX BLD VLV POS e ME-1
FUEL BID VLV POS ME-1
CON INT PR A/B ME-1
CON INT TMP A/B ME--1
CON BUS 1 VOLTAGE ME-1
CON BUS 2 VOLTAGE ME-1
HPF'P I)43 PR A ME-1
HPFP CLNT _ A 141[-1
I.PFP CLN'r I.NR II 141[-1
FPB PC A ME-I
PEIP DS PR B 141[-1
MCC PC AVG ME-I
+36 OE VOLTAGE A ME-1
+36 OE VOLTAGE B ME-I
HPFP IN PR AVG ME-I
HPOP OS PR A ME-t
HPOT S/C PR A ME-1
HPOT S/C PR B ME-1
PBP P._ ]_P. B ME-1
LOX FLOW AVG ME-1
FUEL FLOW At'(; ME-1
FASCOS STATUS _ ME-1
MCC PC A2 ME-1
MCC PC AI ME-1
FUEL FLOW AVG ME-1
LOX FLOW AVG ME-1
FUEL FLOW AI ME-1
MFV ACT PO5 A ME-1
MFV ACT POS B (R ME-1
MOV ACT POS A ME-1
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139
140
141
142
143
145
146
147
148
149
152
154
155
157
158
159
161
162
163
171
172
174
175
176
19e
2ee
2el
2e3
2e4
2e9
21e
211
212
214
219
22e
221
222
223
22¢
225
226
2_2
213
234
237
238
239
24e
251
253
258
26e
261
264
265
256
267
268
269
[41_Ie85o
_61Hle4_o
(41H1e88D
(41Hle43D
E41HlI87D
"E41H1e42D
(41Hle86D
E41Ple48D
(_lP11e60
(41PleS90
E41P1945D
E41Mle97P
E41Mle99P
E41M1e96P
(41M1e98P
E41P10470
(41P1e4go
(41Pl1240
E41Ple52D
(41Ple390
[41HlI17D
(41Hle6eO
[41Hl1130
E41H11140
E41HllISD
E41H11160
E41P1@46D
(41Pll160
E41P1@lTD
(_1P1_2D
(41P1127D
(41PIll40
(41Ple659
• E41PlO140
(41PlO15D
(41pie540
E41P1e57D
E41P10580
E41Ple550
E61PIe560
E+lPlle70
E41P1188D
E41T1e93D
E41T11280
E41TleleO
£41Tle11D
E4ITle12D
E41Tle13D
(61T1111D
E41Tll12D
E41T11(_JO
E41T111ilO
(41R1192D
E41R11030
E41R18340
E41Rlee6D
(41RleeTD
E41M1082D
E41Mle83D
E41HTe63D
E41R1123D
(41Hlle40
E41HlleSD
PCT MOV ACT _ O (R U(-t
PCT OPOV ACT POS A ME-1
PCT OPOV ACT I_ 8 (R ME-1
PCT FPOV ACT POS A M(-t
PCT FPOV ACT POS B (R ME-_
PCT CCV ACT POS A ME-1
PCT CCV ACT POI O (R ME-1
la'S|A HYD _ _ HI ME-1
I_ZA FI_ _ PR A M(-1
PSIA 01=6 PRG PRO t_-1
PSZA HPIrP OS PR A. ME--1
DST RF.G 2,A ME--1
OST R£G 2B ME-1
OST REG 1A ME-1
OST REG 10 ME-1
PSIA F'P9 PC A ME-1
PSIA PBP OS PR O ME-1
_ZA MCC PC B2 M(-I
PSIA blCC PC B1 ME-1
PSIA MC,C I_C AVG M(-I
PCT OI=OV CMD L_MIT ME-1
PCT MF'V _ ME-1
I_T MOV COMMIU_ ME-1
PCT CCV _ ME-1
PCT FPOV C_ ME-1
PCT OPOV C_ M£-I
PSIA HPOP OS fir A " ME-1
PSIA MOC PC B AVG ME-1
PS%A HPFP |NLLrT PR A ME-1
P_ZA i,,FF'_ tNLET _R 8 u(-_
II_IA _ INI.K_ PR A M¢'-1
PSIA HPQP INLET I_R 8 ME-1
PS;A H_ I._ o PR A ME-1
PSIA HPOP ISl e PR B M(-t
PSIA HYO SY$ PR B ME-1
P$IA FUEL PRG PR A ME-1
PSIA FUEL PRG PRO ME-1
PS1A POGO PRCHG PR A ME-1
PSIA POGO PRCHG PR B ME-1
PSIA _ SHTDN PR A ME-1
PSIA IDd SHTDN PR B ME-/
OEGR HPFP INLET TMP A ME-I
OEGR HPF'P INLET TMP B ME-t
OEGR HPFT OS TMP A ME-I
OEGR HPFT OS TMP B M(-I
DEGR HPOT 05 TMP A ME-t
DEGR HPOT OS _ B M(-I
DEGR MFV HYD _ A ME-1
OEGR MFV HYD _ B M(-t
DEC_ MOV HYO "rib A M(-I
DEGR MOV NYO _ O ME-I
GAL/MIN FUEL FLOW A2 M(-1
GAL/MIN FUEL FLOW B2 ME-1
GAL/1MIN FUEL FLOW AI ME-1
RIM I._FP _P_ A ME-1
RPM HPF'P SPEE_ 9 ME-1
ND HARD FAIL PARVAL2 ME-1
ND HARD FAIL PARVAL3 M(-1
PCT POCO RIV POS A U(-1
LBM/5 FUEL MASS FLOW ME-1
PCT AF'V PO_ A ME-1
PCT AF'V POS B ME-?
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SSME Flight Measurements (3 of 3)
27e
271
272
275
28e
281
286
287
288
289
291
292
295
294
5Ol
7516
E_lQl122D
E41QlleI0
E41R112§O
E61QlleeO
£41Mle760
E+lMle770
E41wlee4o
E_IPleg4o
E41JlegeO
E41Jleg10
E41MleeIPe
E41MlEI2P*
E41Mlee3P-
E41Mle81D
E41R108g0
E41Ule329
I.BM/F'r3 FUlL 0i}iS] TY M(-I
UNXTS CALCULATU) KF M(-1
LBM/S L0X MASS FLOW (SO ME-1
UN]TS CALC C2 ME-1
NO VEH CM0 I ME-I
NO VIOl CMO 2 ME-1
S" T]ld£ REFERI_ICE: ME:-1
PS|k PC CNTL RF.F ME-1
NO INHZB|T COUNT 141[-1
NO FID COUNT ME-1
[O WORD ! ME-1
ZO 11/01t0 2 Mlr-1
IO,iG|NE STATUS WO MI[-I
NO HARO FAIL PARVAL1 Ml[-1
GAL/MIN FUEL FLOW BI ME-1
PCT SPARE M£-1
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SSME Facility Measurements (1 of 2)
• - TITLES uTILITY 626289 Vd6.02 ,,
SSME F.ADS DATA FOR STS3eR ME-t OO
FULL NAME DATl:FLTe29.F13/G
TEST NUMBER _ 6290601
TEST _I'ANO _ 6
CUTOFF TIME _ 515.32
NUMBER OF PIDS m 66
FILE FORMAT _ O
PID MSIO UNITS TITLE
TIME Sl[CONOS
553 E41Tl153A DLrGF
554 E41T1154A DL/'GF
821 V41P11eSC PSIA
835 V41PllTeA P_IA
858 V41P1139 P43IA
879 V41Tl171A DEGF
g37 V41P1154A PS|A
938 V41P1153A 1_3IA
1021 V41T1101C DEGF
1035 V41Tl181A D_GF
1058 V41T1131C DEGF
1145 V58T1131A DEGF
1147 VSSTI130A DEGF
1420 E41T1155A DEGF
1421 E41TII56A OEGF
1552 V58H11eeA DEG
1558 V58H115eA D£G
I895 E41TlI52A DEGF
1896 E41T1151A DEGF
1912 E41T115eA DEGF
7001 V41X110gE EVENT
7002 V41X1110[ EVENT
7003 V41X1661E EVI_IT
7004 V61X1596E EVENT
7005 V41X1105E [VENT
7008 V41X1135E
7007 V41X1814.1[ EVENT
7010 V41XlII4X Lr_
7011 V41XlI34X EVENT
7021 V61RII15A RPM
7023 V41P149eA PSIA
7024 V41P159eA PSIA
7027 V41P1600A PSIA
7028 V41P1605A PSIA
7029 V41P1650A PSIA
7031 V41P1158C PSIA
7033 V58PQ137A 1_3IA
7035 VSSUe163C FT/S2
7041 V41P1564A PSID
7042 V41P1464A PSID
7043 V41P1433C PSIA
7044 V41P1533C PSIA
7045 V41T1428A DEGF
7046 V41T1527A DEGF
7047 V41T1528A DEGF
7051 V41Tl151A DEGF
7052 V41Tl152A DEGF
7053 V41T1601A OEGF
7055 VO9T1702A OEGF
B_GINE 2027 CONTROLLER F23
TIME IN SECOIO$
MI_/ DS SXIN TgB 1 I_[-1
MI_/ DS SXIN "1_ 1 I_[-1
E]_G FL IN PR 1 ME-I
FL PRESS INn" PR ME-I
ENG OX IN _ 1 ME-1
GOX PRESS OUT.T UE-1
HELIUM R£P._A OUT PR ME:-1
HELIUM REG8 OUT Pfl ME-1
ENG FL IN T ME-1
GH2 PRESS INT T ME-1
ENG OX IN T ME-1
HYD SYS IF RT LN T ME-1
HYO SYS IF PR LN T ME-1
AFV DS SKZN TE)dP I ME-1
AFV OS SKIN TDdP 2 ME-I
GIM ACT Y POS ME-1
GEM ACT Z POS ME-1
OPOV GOX S L SK T2 ME-1
GOX S L SK TI ME-I
C_NTROLI.J[R II_ TlgdP ME-1
LH2 RECRC VLV OPEN ME-1
LH2 RECRC VLV CLOS ME-1
GH2 PRESS I ON/OFF ME-1
G02 PRESS 1 ON/OFF ME-1
LH2 PREVALV CLOSED ME-1
LOX PREVALV CLOSI_ ME-1
I_IEU _ OPEN
LH2 PREVALVE OPEN ME-1
LOX PflEVALVE OPEN ME-1
LH2 RECIRC PUMP S ME-1
GH2 DISCONNECT PR
COX DIRECT PR
PNEU VLV HE SUPPLY
PNEU VLV HE RG OUT
PNEU ACCt._ PRESS
HE SUPPLY BOTL PR ME-1
HYD SYS CRC I:_ PR ME-1
TOTAL LOAD FACTOR
LH2 SY5 DELTA P
LOX SYS DELTA P
LH2 MAN I FOLD PR
LOX MANIFOLD PR
LH2 MANIFOLD T
LOX MANIFOLD T A
LOX MANIFOLD T 8
AFT FSLG HE SPLY T ME-1
MiD FSLG HE SPLY T ME-I
PNEU VLV HE SUP T
AFT FSLG FLR 8TM T
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SSME Faciffty Measurements (2 of 2)
7056
7057
7060
7081
7065
7066
7070
7075
7091
7092
7093
7094
7095
7096
7097
7098
VegTI720A DEGF RH AFT FSLG SIDE T
VegT1724A DEGF LH AFT FSLG SIDE T
V58T214eA DEGF H ACCUM SY'3 RTN _ ME-t
VSSTe183A DEGF HYD LOX ET R ACT T ME-1
V58Pe114C PSIA HYD SYS SUP PR A ME-1
•VS_Pe116C PSIA HYD SY5 SUP PR C MI[-1
V_SPe616A PSIA HYO ACM SY$ RTNPR ME-I
VSIIPQlI_J_ PSZA HYO S_ SUP PR B M£-1
T41TI706A DF.GF U42 ULLAGE TI_
T41T1755A DLrGF 1.02 ULLAG£ TE)LP
T41P171I4)C PSZA LH2 ULLAGE PRF..S 1
T41P1701C PSIA U,12 ULLAGE _ 2
T41P1702C PSXA LH2 ULLAGE PRES 3
T41P1750C PSZG L02 ULLAGE-pRLrS 1
T41P17_.lC I_IG LD2 ULLAGE PRF_S 2
T41P1752C PSIG L02 ULLAGE PRIES 3
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ATTACHMENT 11
PRELIMINARY SAFD HARDWARE DESCRIPTION
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PRELIMINARY SAFD HARDWARE DEFINITION
The preliminary SAFD hardware configuration consists of eight major
subassemblies: 1) interface panel, 2) control panel, 3) mass data storage
system, 4) time code generator, 5) optic isolation system, 6) command
processor, 7) performance monitor channels interface (PMCI), and
8) uninteruptable power supply. Preliminary information on each major
subassembly is provided in the following sections.
1. Interface Panel. The preliminary layout of the interface panel consists of
five main areas. The first area is the power interface, which includes the main
AC power input, circuit breaker, facility power I/O, and auxiliary power output.
The second area of the interface panel is the analog input interface. The third
area of the interface panel is the PMCI interface, which includes the receiver
inputs, transmit outputs, and vehicle data table (VDT) outputs. The forth area of
the interface panel is the facility clock interface. The fifth area of the interface
panel is the peripheral interface, which includes the printer, monitor, mass
storage, keyboard, mouse, and modem inputs and outputs.
2. Control Panel. The preliminary layout of the control panel consists of three
main areas: Power Status, Algorithm Status, and Algorithm Response.
3. Mass Data Storage System. Hard disk drives contain the operating
system files, algorithm files, and the SAFD data generated by the command
processor during SSME hot-fire testing. Floppy disk drives are available for
loading and unloading data and files. A tape system is available to backup the
hard disk drives. Specific details of each data storage device have not yet been
defined.
4. Time Code Generator. In normal operation, the time code generator
receives the facility IRIG-B signal. This signal is passed tothe command
processor where it is used to time stamp the VDT and analog data. If the IRIGoB
signal is unavailable, the time code generator independently issues a time
stamp signal.
5. Optic Isolation System. The optical isolator isolates the SAFD system
from facility electrical signals that potentially could damage the command
processor.
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6. Command Processor. The command processor is the heart of the SAFD
system. It contains the controller cards for all if the peripherals, the analog to
digital converter card(s), and the central processing unit(s) which process the
engine and facility data and issues commands. The A/D converters will accept
64 single ended or 32 differential -5 to +5 volt discrete analog signals.
Several candidate systems are being evaluated. The leading candidates are
shown in Table A11-1.
7. Performance Monitor Channel Interface. The PMCI acts as a front
end processor for the SSME Vehicle Data Tables (VDT). The main function of
the PMCI is to convert the SSME Channel A and B VDT serial inputs to parallel
outputs. After the 128 words have been converted to parallel data they are
buffered onto the command processor.
The VDT is obtained by inserting coaxial "'r's" into the data lines between the
VEEI buffer (located on the test stand) and the CADS (located in the block
house). The transmit cards in the PMCI are used to perform PMCI loop back
tests. This is done by disconnecting the SSME VDT receiver input cables from
the SAFD and installing short coaxial connectors between the transmit outputs
and receiver inputs.
The receiver inputs receive the 128 word SSME Channel A and B Vehicle Data
Table's eve;-y 40 ms.
8. Uninteruptable Power Supply. The SAFD power (117 volts, 30 amps
maximum) is provided by the facility through the UPS. The UPS will supply
approximately 15 seconds of reserve power incase the facility power fails. This
allows for safe system shutdown by the SAFD operator.
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CPU
TABLE Al1-1
CPU MIPS
BUS TYPE
BUS THROUGHPUT
(Mbyte/sec)
MULTI-TASKING
MULTI-PROCESSING
OPERATING SYS.
A/D THROUGHPUT
(KHz)
A/D RESOLUTION
(bits)
VDT THROUGHPUT
(Mbyte/sec)
SAFD
!INTEL-SBC 386
80386
7.5
rnultibus-lt
40.0
yes
yes
RMX-3
100
CANDIDATE
SUN 3/470
68030
7.0
VME
3.0
yes
yes
_40(
100
12 or 16
HARDWARI_ FEATURES
SUN 4/37O
SPARC
16.0
VME
2.7
yes
yes
LNX
100
12 or 16
VAX 3500
KA650
2.7
O
3.3
yes
no
VMX
200
12
2.6
12
>5 >5
!
!
MicroVAX 3800 '
3.8
Q
3.3
yes
no
VMX
20O
12
2.6
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